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ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate
that stability in the public sector of the economy in the
sphere of personnel relations can only be achieved through a
structured form of meaningful bilateral negotiations.

This

will be done by constructing a conceptual framework of the
bargaining process, then applying this model to the situations
that exist in the public sectors at the federal level in both
the United States and Canada.

This application will be done

with the end in mind of showing that the degree of conformity
is directly related to the degree of stability.

111
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most pressing problems in todayfe society
is the question of personnel relations in the public sector.

The

immediacy and the magnitude of the problem can be seen in the
fact that in both Canada and the United States, the government
is the largest and fastest growing employer in the economy, and,
as such, the importance of the relationships that exist between
it and its' employees' is easily discernible.

Yet stability in

this sector, which is so important to the welfare of the economy
and to the safety of the people, has not been achieved;

proof

of this statement is conveyed to us almost daily through the
various mass media.

It has become almost impossible to read a

newspaper or listen to a news commentary without encountering
an article, or hearing a news release which deals with the
unstable personnel relations which exist in the public sector.
Personnel relations in this sector are in a state of
flux; an environment of uneasiness and restlessness has permeated
every level of government employment as a result of the public
employees' concern over salaries and working conditions.

This

restlessness has been accompanied by a corresponding uneasiness
on the part of the populace, created by fears for public order
and safety in the face of public strikes and work stoppages.
Strikes, such as the one in New York City by 10,000 members of
the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association, which resulted in 10,000
tons of garbage accumulating every day; or the recent strike in
Montreal (November, 1 9 6 9 ) by the police force, which led to wide
spread rioting, only heighten these fears and give a new impetus to
the attempts being made to try to stabilize relations in the public
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-

Stabilizing relations does not imply the total elimination

of industrial unrest.

It only means that personnel relations are

put in a context which enables both sides, management and labour,
to work with each other in a constructive fashion in the hope
that they can resolve their differences before such drastic action
as outlined above is necessary.
In the private sector of the economy, before the
emergence of unions and collective bargaining, industrial relations
were also very unstable.

The employer had absolute power* he hired

and fired at his own discretion and he arbitrarily dictated the
working conditions to which his employees would be subjected.

The

workers had no guarantees and no security* as long as they could
find employment and keep it, they were fairly secure, but if they
were beaten out of their job by stronger and more able men, they
would no longer be in a position that would enable them to provide
for their families.

Their dependence on the labour market for

their livelihood and well being was heightened by the absence of
organized relief institutions that were backed by the wealth and
by the power of the state.

Neither the government nor the busi

ness elite were concerned with the workmen's plight, and if the
individual workers had not put away a portion of their wages to
safeguard against unemployment, both they and their families
would go hungry.

The workers were also at a disadvantage because

the American business elite always ensured that a suitable labour
market was present by manipulating immigration, and when this
was not possible, the black m a n .1

I
For a discussion of the American negro and his role as a supply
component on the labour market, see Eli Ginzberg and Alfred S.
Eichner, The Troublesome Presence, New York.* Mentor Book, 196 ^.
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The labour force as a consequence of the competitive

market could almost be considered to be in a Hobbesian state of
nature.

The lack of uniform labour practices and regulations

meant that the men did not have any common bonds or central
power structure to regulate their relationship with one another.
The cut-throat activity that resulted from this situation, is
a matter of history which can be seen very clearly in the United
States in the 1930's, when the depression heightened the
competition between the workers
That labour relations in the private sector are no
longer unregulated and abusive is due primarily to the presence
of unions and collective bargaining.

Relations between the

employer and the employee are no longer governed on a unilateral
basis, but are rather the result of bilateral negotiations which
take place between the two parties in a collective bargaining
framework.

The bargaining process, as it has developed in

the private sector, has had a great deal of utility as it has
helped to regulate and to stabilize the once unpredictable
relationship which existed between labour and management.

The

concretion of the relationship between the two has been to the
advantage of both as it has allowed each to plan their activities^

2
The conditions that existed in the labour market prior to and
during the depression, are brought out very dramatically in
John Steinbeck's, The Grapes of Wrath, and in Upton Sinclair's,
The Jungle, "can't tell ya about them little fella's layin'
in the tent with their bellies puffed out an' jus' skin on
their bones, an* shiverin' an' whinin' like pups, an' me
runnin* aroun' tryin* to get work — not for money, not for
wages!" he shouted, "Jesus Christ, jus* for a cup o flour an*
a spoon o lard. An* then the coroner come."
John Steinbeck,
The Grapes of Wrath, New Yorki
Yiking Press, 1939* P» 260.
"That was the competitive wage system; .... The workers were
dependent upon a job to exist from day to day, and so bid
against each other, and no man could get more than the lowest
man would consent to work for." Upton Sinclair, The Jungle,
New Yorki
The New American Library, Inc., 1905» p. 308.
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without an excessive fear of labour disruptions during the
duration of a contract.

The utility of the bargaining process

has been that it has substituted a predictable and stable
element in the relationship between the employer and the
employee, for a very tenuous one.
In the public sector of the economy, the relations
between the employer ana the employee, have not followed the
same course as in the private sector.

This is due primarily

to the theory of sovereignty which views the state as an omni
potent or monistic entity.

The theory advances the belief that

the modern state "possesses, or should possess, a single source
of authority that is theoretically comprehensive and unlimited
in its exercise".^

The state is the ultimate power in the

society and as such, its dictates cannot and must not be
questioned?

"it issues orders to all men and associations...

it receives orders from none of them".**'
Inherent in this concept of sovereignty is the theory
of sovereign immunity, which implies that the sovereign power is
not amenable to a suit by an individual without its consent.
As Alexander Hamilton wrote,
The contracts between a nation and an indivi
dual, are only binding on the conscience of
the sovereign and have no pretensions to be a
comprehensive force.
They confer no right
faction, independent of the sovereign will.->

Kung Chuan Hsiao, Political Pluralism, London:
Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1927* P* 2.

Kegan Paul,

4
Harold J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, London:
and Unwin Ltd., 1967* p.

5

George Allen

Alexander Hamilton, The Federalists, Modern Library edition,
1937, pp. 529-530.
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The origin of this concept can he dated back to the
time of absolute monarchy in England when the kings claimed to
rule by divine right.

The ruler was the nucleus of all legis

lative, executive, and judicial authority, and as he supposedly
exercised these prerogatives with divine guidance,

it was incon

ceivable that any citizen would initiate action against him.
"The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a self-evident truth to
anyone who subscribed to the maxim, the King can do no wrong."u
Blackstone expanded on this point when he wrote;

"The King

moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of
thinking wrong;

in him is no folly or weakness.

Since this theory suggests that whatever the govern
ment does is right, it follows that the state cannot be compelled
by either an individual or by a group of citizens to act against
its will which means, of course, that the activities associated
with collective bargaining do not readily lend themselves to
adaptation in the public sector.

Bargaining activity, as will

be seen in chapter I, leads to a collective agreement, and this
places restrictions on both signatories; a collective agreement
O
is in essence a contractual relationship between two parties,0
and this type of association is not possible as long as a
Government refuses to deviate from the theoretical stance of
sovereign immunity.

ft

Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining m the Federal Civil
Service, New York's Harper and Brother, 196^, p. 4l.

n

Quoted in ibid., p. ^1.
8 See Chapter I, supra., p. 23 for clarification of this point.
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By the I960's in Canada, and the United States, however,
it had become apparent that if stability was going to be main
tained in the public sector the governments of these respective
countries were going to have to relinquish some of their sovereign
prerogatives#

This course of action was necessitated because of

the pressures that were being exerted on them to abandon the
unilateral and paternalistic mold which had hitherto characterised
personnel relations*

What was being demanded was the introduction

of a new system of employer-employee relations based on the
concept of bilateral negotiations.
In order to implement, this demand, and as will be shown
in chapter II implementation was essentia]

in order to ensure

stability, both governments turned to the collective bargaining
structure as it had developed in the private sector to see if
it could be adapted to their unique environments.

The result

was that in both Canada and the United States the government
voluntarily agreed to limit its sovereignty in certain areas
under normal conditions to allow a form of collective bargaining
for its public employees#

The new system of employer-employee

relations substituted bilateral negotiations for the old base
of unilateral decision making#
The primary aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that
if labour-management relations in the public sector are going to
be structured on a basis of bilateral negotiations It is impera
tive that these relationships be embodied in a collective
bargaining framework.

If they are not the system can only breed

instability.
In order to pursue this goal it is necessary to first
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analyze collective bargaining as it has evolved in the private
sector in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the
process and the connotations that have come to be attached to
this activity.

This general discussion of collective bargaining

will serve two purposes; first, it will provide a basis on which

future discussions of the process can be structured by explaining
the terms and processes which are involved in it, and second,
the discussion of the basic mechanisms of collective bargaining
will facilitate the development of a framework.

Once a concep

tual framework has been developed in chapter I, a discussion of
the inevitability of bilateral negotiations in the Canadian
public sector will be initiated in chapter 11,9

Chapters III

and IV will be devoted to the application of the bargaining
framework developed in chapter I to the structured forms of
bargaining as they exist in the American and Canadian public
sectors.

The conclusion will consolidate the observations and

conclusions obtained in the two previous chapters into a
general hypothesis which will substantiate my contention that
the basic framework of collective bargaining must be duplicated
in the public sector before stability can be achieved.

9 The Canadian experience rather than the American experience is
used to demonstrate the need to implement bilateral negotiations
because of the accessibility to documents and other relevant
material on the former and the inaccessibility of such material
for the latter.
However, a brief discussion on the American
situation will be included in the first part of chapter III,
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CHAPTER I
Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector
The term 'collective bargaining* was coined by Sydney
and Beatrice Webb in 1891.^

At first, limited connotations

were associated with the phrase, as the activities linked with
it were confined almost exclusively to discussions concerning
wage rateso

However, the evolution of the bargaining process,

which has taken place since that time, has'broadened its' scope
to such an extent that today its usage covers the entire spectrum
of organized relationships which exist between the employer and
o
the employee.
One legal definition of the term iss
The performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agree
ment, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached, if
requested by either party, but such an
obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making
of a concession.^

Although the term, 'collective bargaining', was not instituted
until 1891* many of the processes which are associated with
the term, and which will be discussed in this chapter, origi
nated prior to this date. For a discussion of collective
bargaining activities prior to 1891* see Neil W. Chamberlain,
Collective Bargaining, New Yorks
McGraw-Hill Book Co. Ltd.,
1951, pp. 1-46?

2

For an excellent discussion on the expansion of the scope
of collective agreements see, "Labour Legislation and
Collective Bargaining in the America's", International
Labour Review, vol. 84 (October, 1961), pp. 282-283.

3 Bevars D. Maby, Labour Relations and Collective Bargaining,
New Yorks
The Ronald Press Co., 1966, p. 179* For an
alternative discussion of the modern usage of the term
collective bargaining, see Harold W. Davey, Contemporary
Collective Bargaining, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.t
PrenticeHall, 1951* PP« 6-7.
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Collective bargaining, therefore, is a bilateral process,
through which two participants negotiate the terms and condi
tions which will regulate their relationships with one another.^
These two participants are management on the one hand
and, on the other, the union, or its bargaining agent.^

The

former represents the stock-holders or owners of the company,
and the latter represents the employees in the bargaining unit.
These two parties, however, are not free to negotiate in an
unrestricted or unrestrained fashion because they are both
subject to internal and external pressures.
Internal pressures are applied against both the
parties engaged in collective bargaining activity because both
the unions and the companies are complex organizations that
are characterized by specialization and differentiation of
responsibilities, and this diffusion of authority makes internal
conflict almost a certainty.

An illustration of this diffusion

can be seen in the fact that both management and the bargaining
agent normally delegate their powers regarding negotiations,

For the purposes of this paper, I will follow Maby's and
Davey's view of collective bargaining which was
that the
process covers the entire spectrum of organized relationships
that exist between union and labour.
It should be pointed
out, however, that there is an opposing point of view which
breaks this spectrum into two parts; contract administration
and contract interpretation, with the term 'collective
bargaining' being associated with only the former.
See
Neil W. Chamberlain, "Grievance Proceedings and Collective
Bargaining", Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister, (eds.),
Insights Into Labour Issues, New Yorks
Macmillan, 1.9^8, p. 8 6 .
A "bargaining agent is the certified representative of the
bargaining unit" and "bargaining unit means a unit of employees
appropriate for collective bargaining"; see the Labour
Relations Act, R.S.O. (i9 6 0 ), c. 202, s. 5(1)»
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- 10 first to a negotiations committee, and ultimately to a chief
negotiator.^

Therefore, when trying to discern what internal

pressures are applied against the negotiating process, one
has to look at the role of the chief negotiator and work
back from there.
Most of the studies dealing with the dynamics of
interactions between institutions, have been undertaken under
the "simplifying assumption that chief negotiators act with a
single purpose in mindj to carry out the wishes of the
organization they represent".

But this1underlying assumption

is not exactly correct, because organizations, although they
are structured on a hierarchical basis, do not have a mono
lithic goal pattern.

This is not to say that organizations

do not have a well defined goal pattern which permeates

the

6 For a comprehensive discussion of bargaining agents and
management and their devolution of power, see Edward E.
Herman, "Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit",
Occasional Papers L2-26, Department of Labour, (November,
1966), pp. 2-6.
? Robert B. McKersie, Charles R. Perry and Richard E. Walton,
"Intra-organizational Bargaining in Labour Negotiations",
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 9 (December, 1965),
p. 463* For an interesting discussion concerning whether
these internal divisions and conflicts should be allowed
to appear at the bargaining table, principle of dissent,
or whether they should be suppressed, principle of unanimity,
see William M. Evan and John A. MacDougall, "Interorganizational Conflicts
A Labour-Management Bargaining Experiment",
Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XI (December, 1967 ),
pp. 398-^130
See also Thomas Schellings, Strategy of Conflict,
New Yorks
Oxford Press, 1 9 6 3 , pp. 21-3^, for a discussion of
how the cohesive of demands effects the bargaining strategy.
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structure from the top to the bottom, but rather that this
pattern can only be the ultimate goal of the organization.
The specialization and differentiation of responsibilities,
within the structure itself, gives use to different inter
mediary goals through which their initiators hope to pursue
and to achieve, the ultimate goals of the organization.
It is these sub-goals that exist within the organi
zation, which apply pressure on the negotiating process.
Pressure is applied because each specialized function in the
organizational hierarchy wants to ensure that the negotiator
follows a policy which is conducive to its own plans and
desires.

Figure one illustrates this point.^
Figure 1

Union

Company

GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL
UNION
GOALS OF LOCAL UNION

GOALS OF THE COMPANY
*»
m
CA
T>

GOALS OF TOP MANAGEMENT I

y>
TO
(A

GOALS OF NEGOTIATING
COMMITTEE

l/V
c;
73
m

GOALS OF WAGE
ADMINISTRATORS

'■V

Chief
Negotiator
GOALS OF UNION
OFFICIALS

Chief
Negotiator

uy 4rs

GOALS OF STAFF GROUPS

7$ n»

GOALS OF RANK AND
FILE

GOALS OF PERSONNEL
DEPARTMENT
GOALS OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS

8 This diagram is a modified version of one which appeared in
McKersie, op.cit., p. 463.
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Internal influences, however, extend beyond the
pressures which are applied by the organization and its
component parts; they are also present within the minds of
the negotiating team.

The men involved in the negotiating

process cannot divorce their own values, beliefs, perceptions
and images from their work, and as a consequence, the verstehen
influence becomes an important variable in the process.

The

verstehen influence is an important variable because it suggests
that an actor sees behavior solely on the basis of his understanding of his own motivations.

Therefore, concept formation

and planned strategy cannot be construed on neutral grounds
but must be the result of each individual's perception of him
self and his drives.

Consequently,

each actor in the negotiating

team can be seen to have a personnel influence on the outcome
of the negotiations.^

Weber, however, would not have accepted

this last statement; he would have argued that if the organi
zation was structured in a legal-rational fashion-**® all outputs
of the organization, including any collective agreement, would
be fairly value free due to the filtering process that is
inherent in all such structures.

But, I would suggest one can

question the applicability of Weber's argument in this case;

9 For a discussion of the Weberian concept of the verstehen
operation, see* Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept Formation in
Normative and Empirical Studies", American Political Science
Review, vol. 6 3 , 1969, pp. 26-39*
10

Weber claimed that advanced bureaucracies stand in a specific
sense under the principle of sine ira ac studio. This means
that bureaucracies are dehumanized; they eliminate from
official business love, hatred and all purely personal,
irrational and emotional elements.
See Max Weber, Essays in
Sociology, edited by H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New Yorki
Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 215-216.
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the negotiating team and the chief negotiator, although they
are responsive to influences from their respective organizations,
are not part of a structural hierarchy when they are involved
in negotiationse
Figure (2) illustrates, that in the collective bargai
ning process, the filtering process does not function properly
because all pressures are not filtered through the organization.
Some of the pressure is exerted, as illustrated, directly on
the negotiator.

Therefore, the bargaining process is not

strictly a rational one.

This leaves the negotiator with a

greater flexibility in determining outputs than in any other
process in the organization and this means, of course, that he
is more vulnerable to his own verstehen prejudices.
Figure 2

RATIONAL
OUTPUT
RATIONAL £
OUTPUT

u f f

'I't

L -j\ f f 'F T f ^

A f f
/JV

/f> yji.

f I'T t 11
yp. /Jv

.-Jv

Normally in a legal-rational structure, the verstehen processes
are filtered out as the policies move up the hierarchy.
Even if
the policy is emitted from the organization at a level lower than
the apex, the policy has had some filtering, and is still
considered to be rational.

* CHIEF

* NEGOTIATOR

For the negotiating process, however, the structure can be consi
dered to be departmentalized with each department exerting influ
ence directly on the negotiator, without the benefit of any prior
filtering process.
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Besides the major sources of internal pressure which
have heen discussed above, there are also a number of external
forces which apply pressure on both the negotiating process
and on the two organizations involved; these are labour laws,
the mutual need for co-operation, public opinion, the relative
public interest and the threat of industrial warfare.

These

influences are extremely important, as they help to mould the
images and attitudes of the two sides, and both must incor
porate them into their valuations and judgements.
The requirements of law are an important influence
that must be taken into account by both sides because they
define the parameters within which management and union operate.
For example, in 1944 Canada introduced the Wartime Relations
Regulations in Dominion Order In Council P.C. 1003;^

these

regulations were patterned after the United States' Wagner
Act of 1935 *12

They legislated that a corporation not only had

to recognize a union that had obtained certification from the
National Labour Relations Board, but also stipulated that it
must meet, and negotiate, in good faith with the designated
agent.

Labour laws, besides this one basic example, also affect

the company's and the union's manoeuvrability by defining mini
mum wage levels and the maximum number of hours that an employee
can be required to work under.

H

Labour legislation also dictates

For a discussion of these regulations and the Industrial
Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (IRDI) of 1948,
which replaced them, see Herman, op.cit., pp. 21-2?.

12 p or a discussion of the National Labour Relations (Wagner)
Act of 1935, see Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining,
op.cit., pp. 300-301.
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the conditions under which the union may be certified, the
size of the bargaining unit and the type of unit that is to
be

r e c o g n i z e d .

^3

^g

a b ove

examples are only a few illu-

strations of the host of statutes

that affect both union

and management, but they sufficiently demonstrate the point
that both union and management have to be consciously aware
of the limitations this external pressure places on their
activities.
The second external influence that exerts pressure
on each of the organizations and, therefore, has to be taken
into account, is the need for mutual co-operation on the part
of both management and labour.

There exists between these

two parties a genuine interdependence.

Both realize that they

are dependent on the ongoing enterprise, and consequently are
limited m

15

the commitments they make by the requirement that

the enterprise must be kept going.

1 ft

The company realizes

that it requires employees to carry out the various functions
that are essential to its production, and the employees recognize

*3 These legislative acts all come under the jurisdiction of
respective Federal and Provincial Labour Relations Boards.
For a detailed discussion of Labour Laws and their effect
on the bargaining process, see Charles Lipton, The Trade
Union Movement of Canada, 1827 - 1959* Montreal!
Canadian
Social Publications Ltd., i 9 6 0 . Also H.D. Woods and
L. Ostry, Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada,
Torontos
MacMillan, 1964, pp. 3-159•
15 "Commitments 'is used here to denote a bargaining stance that
is non-negotiable.
See Schelling op.cit., pp. 24-28.
1 ft

Survival in this context refers to the economic definition
which stipulated that a satisfactory profit must be made
to induce the entrepeneur to continue the operation.
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their need for employments

Therefore, since hoth sides realize

their need for one another, a mutual ground for co-operation
evolves, and as a result introduces a cautionary element into
the stance of hoth sides.

17

'

This concept of co-operation as a restraining device
that ensures the continuance of the operation, which is taken
to be relative to the optimum position of both the employer
and the employee, was brought out by Zeuthen when he constructed
his utility frontier;

1 ft

see figure (3)»
Figure 3

Utility of Management
Utility Frontier

lit Utility of Union

The points P^-P? represent the offers of the union and the
management respectively.
These points show the differing
degrees of utility that will be achieved by each side.
Settle
ment can only come about when ^ 2 2 ^ 2 1 ^ 1 1 ^ 1 2 which is shown
by P 3 .

For a discussion of the cautionary element in bargaining
necessitated by the survival instinct see Schelling,
op.cit., p p 0 21-22.
For a complete discussion of Zeuthen*s utility frontier
and general theory of bargaining, see Robert L. Bishop,
"A Zeuthen-Hicks Theory of Bargaining", Econometrica,
vol. 32 (July, 196*0, pp. l'lG-417. Also see Edward
Saragdar, "Zeuthen*s Theory of Bargaining", Econometrica,
voli 33 (October, 1 9 6 5 ). pp* 802-813*
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He suggested that the bargaining undertaken by both sides,
take place upon the utility frontier, and that eventual
settlement results from the bargainers conducting their
activities in a rational fashion.

By rational, Zeuthen means

that each part considers holding out for a more favourable
settlement than the one offered to him, only when he feels
that such an action will yield a positive expected gain.
A positive gain, he argues, cannot be obtained by either
side if an irreconcilable conflict arises: therefore, both
sides, when they pursue net gains, will be sure to stay on
the utility frontier which represents all solutions that
are both possible and practical.^9
The third external influence that plays an active
role in determining the direction and limitations of demands
on the part of both management and labour, is public opinion.
The pressure exerted by this force is very potent, and as a
consequence, must be weighed very carefully by both sides.
A miscalculation by either could alienate public opinion,
which would create a very precarious foundation for either of

19
The co-operative element as a restraining force is played
down by Vernon H. Jensen, "The Process of Collective
Bargaining and the Question of i t ’s Obsolescence", Industrial
and Labour Relations Review, vol. 16 (July, 19&3),
pp. 5^6-55^0
H® suggests that collective bargaining is not
a process of reasoning, nor is it primarily a process of
economic analysis; he claims that it is a relationship
which is based on the sole criteria of power.
The settle
ment which is finally agreed upon is not the culmination
of rational arguments based on market conditions and
prevailing economic tendencies, but is rather the result
of a primitive power struggle when each side attempts to
extract as much from its opponents as its relative strength
permits.
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their respective positions.

Reasons for the potency of this

force are; first, it has a real and definite effect on the
morale of both the management and the union; and second, it
may provoke legislative action aimed at settling the dispute
to the detriment of one of the parties involved.
Public opinion's effect on the morale of both
participants is an important variable on the outcome of any
dispute;

for example, if the public is favourable to the

position of the union, its membership is reinforced by the
knowledge that it is not standing alone against management.
The financial hardships that are imposed upon the employees
due to the dispute, are alleviated somewhat by the moral
support that comes from the community.

The bargaining unit's

position is also enhanced by their knowledge that, management,
in the face of adverse public opinion, is probably going to
be compelled to retract from its position; if the company does
not do so, it is running the risk of being blamed for prolonging
the strike, which may very well alienate the public from its
OA
products in the long run.
If, conversely, public opinion
is favourable to the position of the company, the above effects
are reversed.

The union feels not only isolated from the

company, but also from the entire community and the psycholo
gical impact on its membership may weaken their position

20
The argument can be made that the alienation of the public
to a company is also detrimental to the position of union
membership in the long run, as it may cut down on employment
levels.
However, for the purposes of this paper, we will
assume that the company's growth rate, rather than its
present capacity, is placed in jeopardy.
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considerably#

The company, when it has public opinion on its

side, will be reluctant to give in to the union's demands
because it will feel that it is operating from a position of
strength.
Public opinion, beside giving moral support to
participants, may also result in governmental intervention
or legislative action aimed at terminating the dispute, and
when the government intervenes in a conflict it cannot do so
in a completely neutral fashion.

Thus public opinion can

force the government to take action, and when it does, it
usually will be sympathetic to the side public opinion is
favouringo

For example, in 19^5 the public was outraged at

reports that the U.A.W. had withdrawn all their maintenance
men from the Ford power house in Windsor; an act that not
only completely crippled the Ford operation, but actually
endangered the property.

The public outcry initiated by this

behavior, forced Ontario's Premier Drew to act; he requested
immediate assistance from Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who
responded by authorizing the dispatch of Royal Canadian Mounted
Police reinforcements to Windsor, and by mobilizing tanks and
pi
troops in Camp Borden. x
Public opinion is therefore an important variable
which sets the limits in which the participants involved in
the bargaining process are free to act.

If they overstep

these limits they arouse public hostility, and as a consequence,
a great deal of pressure can be levied against them which
cannot help but hurt their stance.

The importance of public

21 For a complete discussion of the Ford strike, see Saragdar,
op.cit., pp. ^ 8- 50 *
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opinion can be seen in the fact that during a strike, or just
prior to it, both sides attempt to win public support or at
least try to ensure that it is not hostile to them.
The fourth external influence that has an effect on
both management and labour is the related concept of the
public g o o d . 22

Modern society is not a laissez-faire one

where each component is free to pursue its own ends oblivious
to the needs of the others.

Today all gains in society must

be relative? that is, every organization must ensure that its
programmes are in concert with the aims of the entire society.
If they are not, the society will not tolerate them and will
force changes through legal means.

Therefore, each participant

in the bargaining process must ensure that its position falls
within the range of public tolerance which is defined by the
general aims of the society;

if they do not, they face almost

certain interference on the part of the government.

Examples

of this type of interference can be seen in many Latin American
countries where foreign owned companies are forced to alter
their relationship with their domestic employees if they wish
to continue operating.
The fifth external influence that has an effect on
both management and labour is the threat of industrial warfare.
This activity includes an entire spectrum of alternatives
ranging from a shutting down of the plant by the company, to

Qp

For a discussion on this external influence, see Arnold R.
Weber, Collective Bargainings
Problems and Perspectives,
New York*
The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 19&1, pp. xxviii
to xxxii.
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a strike "by the workers.
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The threat of any such action is a

very significant influence, "because this type of activity has
serious implications for both the company and the workers.
When a serious dispute breaks out between a company
and a union, both sides have a number of alternative courses
of action they can threaten to pursue.

The company in the

case of hostilities can use the suicidal technique of going
out of business;23 or it can attempt to weaken the union by
either forcing a strike when environmental conditions are
unfavourable, or they can jam the grievance procedure to
undermine the Union's effectiveness and "use their superior
financial resources to carry numerous grievances to arbitration,
to pauperize a union's treasury".2**

Another tactic open to

the company is the formation of employer leagues with other
industries such as the Canadian Manufacturers Association.
Collectively the members of the C.M.A. constitute a very
formidable body, and as such, are in an excellent position to
wage a propanganda war against unionism; this has the effect
of further weakening the union's treasury because the unions
have to retaliate.

Management organizations also take an

active role lobbying in both Ottawa and the provincial capital
fo r a n t i - l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n . ^

^

The threat of this technique was used in Windsor in the Spring
of 1969 when the Plasticast Corporation, a division of Noranda
Mines threatened to close down their plant.
The warning was
credible to the union and helped to bring about a settlement.

2^ Mabry, op.cit., p. 375*
25 For a discussion on the organization and some of the activities
of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, see Francois Lemieux,
"Lobbying Plus the C.M.A.", Politics Canada, Paul Fox (ed.),
Toronto 1 McGraw-Hill Co., 1966.
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Another weapon at the disposal of management,

is its legal

ability to utilize strike breakers.
The unions, on the other hand, also have a number
of weapons at their disposal.

In a labour dispute the strategy

of each party is to bring as much pressure on the opponent as
possible in order to force him to concede the issue or issues
at hand, and the union accomplishes this objective primarily
by utilizing its most potent weapon, the strike.
The strike has been the traditional means
used to resolve serious conflicts in the
private sector if negotiations failed to
produce a peaceful settlement.
In most
cases, striking employees leave the plant,
one or more pickets are posted, the situa
tion is publicized and the plant does not
operate, as all services are withheld.
The workers by "voluntarily withholding their labour,
deprive an employer of an essential r e s o u r c e " , w h i c h
required for the operation of the firm.

is

This weapon can even

become more powerful if the unions are able to extend their
influence to other workers servicing the company, as this
type of activity can deprive the employer of other essential
resources or separate him from his markets.

But unions can

only utilize the strike legally at a specific stage in the
negotiations process, usually after conciliation, and as a
result have to rely upon other weapons at the other stages.

J.H. Foeger, "The Partial Strike*
A Solution in Public
Employment", Public Personnel Review, vol. 30 (April,

1969), p. 85.
Mabry, op.cit., p. 37?•
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It may encourage its workers to resort to slowdowns, sabotage,
or absenteeism, all of which wreak havoc with a company's
production schedule, and which can result in severe financial
loss to the manufacturer.
Also, unions, like management, utilize lobbying and
propaganda techniques in a continuous attempt to ensure
suitable government policies and a favourable public image,
as both of these factors are necessary prerequisites to the
creation of a suitable labour environment.
The above discussions have illustrated the point
that labour laws, the mutual need for co-operation, public
opinion, the relative public interest, and the threat of
industrial warfare are all potent external influences that
effect the bargaining process; neither side can afford to
ignore any of them when formulating their bargaining strategy.
Each party must ensure that during the give and take process
of negotiating they keep in touch with the internal goals of
the organization while remaining at the same time in concert
with the external forces being applied against them.

If they

do not, the negotiations, which may be looked upon as a
conversion process leading to the collective agreement, will
probably be to their detriment.
The negotiations that take place between management
and labour are, "akin to the creation of a constitution";
the collective agreement that comes out of the conversion

John T. Dunlop and James J. Healy, Collective Bargaining;
Principles and Cases, Howewood, Illinoiss
Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1953> P» 8^.
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process, like a constitution of a state, tries to reflect past
experiences while at the same time attempting to embody provisions
aimed at covering all possible eventualities.

The collective

agreement's adaptative task is made somewhat easier, however,
in that it comes up for renewal after a specific length of
time, which usually is between one and three years.
Therefore, since no two unions or companies have
had an identical past or expect to experience exactly the same
future, no two labour agreements can be exactly alike.

However,

the categories into which the terms of all labour agreements
can be classified are fairly uniform.
ares

These classifications

the coverage and applicability of the agreement, wages

and wage supplement programmes, working time, seniority

and

job rights, and operating rules and industrial jurisprudence . ^
The first section of the collective agreement is
usually concerned with the coverage and the applicability of
the agreement.

It contains a number of clauses which provide

29
An alternative classification of the collective agreement
was set forth by Professor H.D. Woods in his essay "Some
Problems Related to Collective Bargaining in the Public
Service", Collective Bargaining in the Public Service,
Fredericton, N.B.s
Canadian Labour Federation, (May 5,
i 9 6 0 ). In this article he claimed that the agreement
could be broken down into three parts; first clauses
which deal with the relationship between the two parties
which include (a) the union recognition clause, and (b)
the management's rights clause; second, the substantive
clauses which contain employment standards; and third,
the procedural clauses which establish the steps to be
taken to ensure that the rights shall be protected and
obligations observed.
This classification scheme is set
out in greater detail in H.D. Woods and Sylvia Ostry,
Labour Policy and Labour Economics in Canada, Torontos
MacMillan of Canada, 1962, pp. 12-15•
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the foundation for the rest of the agreement:

for example,

the clauses usually state the purpose of the agreement;
identify the parties bound by the agreement;

outline the

rights and responsibilities of each, and define the duration
for which the agreement is valid.

30

A second segment of the contract deals with wages
and. wage supplement plans as a single category;

for together,

they constitute .labour costs to the e m p l o y e r , A s

a result,

this section is one of the most complex of any appearing in
the agreement, as it not only has to establish a classification,
but also has to deal with such wage supplements as holiday
and vacation pay, pension plans, separation payments,

insurance

policies, hospitalization or disability benefits, and supple
mentary employment benefits.

It is usual to also include in

this section, a. number of clauses which deal, with the rights
of laid-off and retired employees in so far as the above
benefits are concerned.

The clauses stipulate the procedures

to be followed in determining their eligibility for the benefit
programmes.

This section also defines the financial, contribu

tions for the various programmes that are to be made by both.

30
An example of a collective agreement which conforms roughly
to this classification scheme, is given in Chamberlain,
Collective Bargaining, op.cit., Appendix R., pp. ^99-525.
The agreement reproduced in these pages is the one which
was signed by General Motors and the United Auto Workers on
May 29, 1950.
31
See M.W. Neder, "The Theory of Union Wage Policy", in
Labour and Trade Unionism, New Yorks
John Wiley and. Sons,
i 960, pp’o 3- 2?.
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- 26 the company and the employees?

sets forth the means of adminis

tering the programmes; outlines the benefits to he provided by
these activities, and specifies the appeal procedure which
will he provided to handle any disputes and grievances.
The third section dealing with the working time of
the employees is also a very intricate part of the collective
agreement.32

jt is closely aligned to the second section as it

specifies the amount of time that an amployee will have to work
before he qualifies for the specified wage rates and wage
supplements®

But this section is far more inclusive than this

statement would suggest, as the clauses in this segment usually
govern the days that will be worked, the number of hours per day,
which hours of the day the employees will be required to
which. may a] so include shift rr,x” ticn, the .'’mount of td me that
can be devoted to set-up, washup and housekeeping, and the
number of breaks or reliefs that the employee can take.

As a

result, working time constitutes an important ingredient of
the agreement for both the employer and the employee.

The

former is concerned with the regulations controlling the hours
of work, because various time studies have demonstrated that
the number of hours worked, directly influence the unit labour
cost.

But, besides allowing the company to ensure that its

marginal cost of labour always remains properly proportionate
to the unit cost, the stipulations regarding hours of work

32

For a thorough discussion of this section of the collective
agreement, see Maurice S. Trotta, Collective Bargaining,
New Yorks
Simons-Boardsman, 1961," pp. 251- 256 ®
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also allow it to run the plant in an efficient manner, as it
is able to draw up its production plans months in advance.
The latter is interested in the hours of work that are going
to be expected of him, because it is only through a detailed
knowledge of both his obligations and rights concerning his
working time, that an employee can plan his leisure time.
A fourth section of the collective agreement usually
deals with seniority and job rights.

"In a society ruled by

law rather than men, arbitrary and capricious actions by those
in authority that influence the lives of others, are restricted
by rules and regulations".33

Collective agreements attempt to

extend this rule of law to the industrial sphere.

Of funda

mental importance to every worker, are questions pertaining to
job rights, promotion, transfer, demotion, lay-off and recall,
shift selection and job assignments.

If peace and goodwill are

to prevail in the industry, it is important that some arrange
ments be made that are considered to be fair and just in order
that the job rights can be determined and job opportunities
can be allocated in an agreeable fashion.

The basic solution

that has been accepted in most industries is the one based on
the seniority principle.3^
Seniority systems, however, are very complex and fall
into many conflicting categoriesj the two main ones are most

33 Mabry, op.cit;, p. 337*
rth

For an interesting and concise discussion on seniority,
see James J. Healy, Creative Collective Bargaining,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965*
pp. 33-3^.
In his discussion of seniority, the author
mentions a new term, 'juniority*, which is gaining
popularity in plants with substantial supplementary
unemployment benefits.
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commonly referred to as straight seniority and qualified
seniority.

"Straight seniority signifies that length of

service is a prime requisite for any preferences, while
qualified seniority implies that an employee must have specific
qualifications, such as experience and specialized skills to
receive a

p r e f e r e n c e . "35

There definitions, however, give

rise to a number of questions such ass
apply?

How is seniority computed?

To whom does seniority

How may it be lost?

Each industry has its own conditions that determine
the answers to these questions.

It usually takes a number of

years of trial and error before a definition can be formulated
that is adequate to meet both the operating needs of the
company and the workers' concept of justice.

However, there

are a number of general principles that can be mentioned and
examined.
Seniority is usually only granted to full-time
employees after they have finished a probationary period, and
is dated either from the day of employment, or the day probation
is terminated.

It may be based on the length of service in the

company, within a department, within a particular plant, or on
the job, depending on the stipulations in the collective
agreement.

Each individual contract will also specify how

seniority may be lost, but a number of common reasons ares
discharge for cause, voluntary quitting, failure to return
within a stipulated period during lay-off, and absence from
work for a given period of time without notice.

35 Trotta, op.cit., p. 3 56.
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- 29 Seniority is one of the most useful concepts in
labour relations, as it is used not only to determine a wide
variety of job rights, but also to determine employment rights
during lay-off, which include the priority list for recalling
workers, the extablishing of transfer rights, and the oppor
tunities for ’b u m p i n g ' o t h e r employees with less seniority.
Therefore, in view of the above discussion, seniority clauses
can be seen to constitute a very important part of the collec
tive agreement,
A fifth section of the collective agreement is
usually concerned with operating rules and industrial juris
prudence*

This segment of the agreement outlines the basic

rules that govern the conduct of a plant and set forth the
punishment that can be expected in case of an infraction of
these rules.

Also included in this section are clauses

pertaining to the necessity for, and the mutual advantage of,
maintaining safe and healthy working conditions.
Negotiations of contracts in this area rarely raise
serious or basic problemsi

The disputes arising out of this

section usually occur after the contract has been signed in
respect to methods and intent of the parties.

Settlement of

these disagreements is usually obtained through participation
of both sides in the grievance procedure.

In most cases, if

an agreement cannot be concluded, the matter must be referred

36 Bumping refers to the procedure which allows one employee,
if he is qualified, to request and to obtain the job of
another employee who has less seniority.
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30 to an impartial arbitrator.
The contractual grievance procedure is the usual
way of settling differences arising out of a
collective agreement,0oIn broad outline, grievance
procedures have been largely standardized.,.though
in detail, considerable variation still exists.
The provisions which set out the various proce
dural stages are usually very detailed.
Normally
they provide for a succession of steps through
which complaints may be processed from lower to
higher echelons in the management and union
hierarchy.
In the case of grievances that cannot
be resolved at any one of the steps by the parties
themselves, reference to an arbitration jointly
chosen by the parties, is usually provided for,
as the last step.3'
The arbitrator does not have any authority to alter the
agreement; he simply interprets it and both sides must abide by
his decision.
The collective agreement is not a contract in the strict
sense,but in specific
to follow

situations it can legally bind the parties

a prescribed course of behavior in their relationships

with one another.3®

As a result, the negotiations leading up to

37________________ ,"Labour Leglislation and Collective Bargaining
in the America's," International Labour Review, vol. 84(October, 19&1), p.' 285.
3® In Canada, the legal status of the collective agreement was
recognized in the 1 9 ^ Wartime Labour Relations, P.C. 1003,
and this principle has been extended In both federal and
provincial statutes since that time. Canada is unique in the
fact that during the lifetime of a collective agreement, disputes
over its application must be settled by arbitration with the
strike and lockout explicitly banned; this compulsory arbitration
based on the content of the collective agreement, implies that
the agreement is a lpgal contract.
The Ontario Labour Relations
A c t , R.S.O. i 960 , C.C- S e c t i o n 37, readsi
A c o l l e c t i v e a g r ee me nt
is...binding upon the employer and upon the trade union that is
a party to the agreement...and upon the employees in the bargai
ning unit defined in the agreement.
For a thorough discussion
on this point see C.H. Curtis, The Enforcement of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, Kingston, Ontario» Industrial Relations
Centre, Queen's University, 1967 , pp. 1-3*
For an argument
against this type of compulsory settlement, see Stanley A.
Little, "Union or Association Objectives:
A Labour Viewpoint",
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Theory and Practice,
Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.), Chicago, Illinois:
Public Personnel
Association, 1967, p. 55*
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the collective agreement are often drawn out, and tend to become
quite tedious, as both sides are careful to ensure that they
receive their basic requests while not becoming a partner to
any disadvantageous provisions that would bind them for the
length of the contract.

A great deal of attention is given to

the language in which the terms are phrased, and usually the
document is constructed or reviewed by a team of attorneys
before it is signed.

It is not surprising therefore, that the

negotiations often break down.

When this occurs, one, or all,

of three techniques can be employed to bring about a meeting
of minds of the participants in the labour dispute; these are
mediation, conciliation and arbitration.
Mediation occurs when a neutral party is a p p o i n t e d ^
to act as a go between.

When negotiations break down and the

two parties refuse to meet at the negotiating table, a neutral
mediator can play a very important role.

His most important

function and his first concern, is to discover some common
area in which the combatants may resume negotiations.

To this

end, the mediator often arranges to meet privately with each
party to determine the true bargaining position of each, which
for strategic reasons, they would not want to reveal fully to
the other side.

These private meetings usually show him how

far the two sides really are from settlement, and from this
understanding, he is able to map out his future strategy.

This

39 Mediators are usually appointed by a neutral government body.
In the United States, they are usually made by the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, and in Canada, by the
Department of Labour, at either the Federal or provincial
level depending on the nature of the industry.
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plan of action may involve suggesting proposals for settlement,
but usually not with the expectation that the parties will
adopt the recommendations, but in the hope that the proposals
will suggest a new line of approach which will stimulate the
resumption of bargaining.
Conciliation takes place when the two antagonists
meet with each other in the presence of a conciliation b o a r d ^
in an attempt to reach an agreement.
imply compulsion}

Conciliation does not

the disputants are not required by law to

consent to the proposals of a conciliation board; they are
merely required to wait before they take any remedial action
against the lack of agreement "until an attempt has been made
to effect an agreement with the assistance of a conciliation
officer and conciliation board, and fourteen days has elapsed
after the conciliation board reported to the Minister of Labour".
In -'theory the process of conciliation simply encourages the manage
ment and the bargaining agent to use reason instead of force.
"Men of good will can reach an agreement, particularly when the
commonwealth is endangered; given the place and opportunity, they
ho

will employ intelligence rather than belligerence."^

The Conciliation Board is usually appointed by the appropriate
Labour Relations Board, and it usually consists of three
members, one nominated by labour, one by management,
and the
third a neutral nominee, usually the chairman, appointed
either by the other two nominees, or by the M i n i s t e r of
Labour.
If,i
Up

Woods and Ostry, op.cit., p. 80.
Trotta, op.cit., p. 89*
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- 33 Compulsory arbitration, unlike conciliation, implies
compulsion.

The two sides are bound by the decision of a neutral

arbitrator.

However, this practice is not sanctioned in law

in the private sector, nor has it obtained much popularity in
collective agreements.

Collective bargaining is basically a

two-party relationship and therefore, it is only logical that
the final decision will result from direct discussion between
these two sides.^3
This concludes the discussion of collective bargaining
as it exists in the private sector.

What needs to be done now

In holding the view that compulsory arbitration is not a
suitable means to settle disputes, I am accepting labour's
claims that the strike is a basic right of all employees
and an essential component of the bargaining process.
However, an eloquent argument for compulsory arbitration
is set out by Professor O.W. Phelps, "Compulsory Arbitrations
Some Perspectives", Industrial and Labour Relations Review,
vol. 18 (October, 1964), p. 81 and I feel that his remarks
on this topic are worth reproducing.
Over the years, the case against compulsory
arbitration of labour disputes has been argued with such
skill and conviction that the brief for the defense seems
to have been lost.
Quite apart from the merits, this is
a curious development in a community where the compulsory
arbitration of other types of dispute is considered an
ornament of a free society.
If a neighbour commits a
trespass, or a business associate fails to honour his
contract, he is hauled before a magistrate and the matter
compulsorily arbitrated rather than settled by force of
arms.
Even in the difficult and delicate area of domestic
relations, questions of child custody and separate mainte
nance may be brought to compulsory arbitration at the option
of an agrieved party.
Our whole system of jurisprudence
relies on the idea that anyone with a grievance is able to
compel an antagonist to meet him peaceably at a public
hearing where, after argument, a binding third-party
settlement is handed down. No one apologizes for this;
more often than not, the courts are referred to as protectors
of our liberties, defenders of freedom.
The unanimity with
which it has been held that labour disputes must be exempted
from this process is remarkable in itself.
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is to extract from this complex process its basic framework in
order that it can he applied to the American and the Canadian
public sector.

h
s"'u

The application of the basic framework o f 1

collective bargaining to the structured forms of bargaining
that exist in these public sectors will be done with a view to
verifying the thesis that the duplication of this framework
is essential for stability.
Collective bargaining is a two-party relationship;
the two sides, one representing management and the other labour,
meet and discuss in a meaningful fashion all the important
matters affecting the relationship that exists between them.
In the case of an impasse between the two, either during the
negotiations of a contract or arising from its interruption
or application there exists a structured method through
a resolution can be reached.

which

The end result of the process is

^
f1

a written agreement which is designed to govern the conduct

ro

of both management and labour over a given period of time.
The above is the basic framework of collective
bargaining;

it is simple but it embodies all the important

aspects of the process.

Consequently it becomes a useful tool

which can be used to analyze the Canadian and American experiences
with collective bargaining in the public sector.
However, before initiating a discussion on this point
it is necessary to first demonstrate that some type of bilateral
negotiations are necessary in the conduct of personnel relations
in the public sector before a claim can be made that implemen
tation of the bargaining framework is the most conducive to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

stability.

35

-

To demonstrate the necessity of bilateral negotiations

no reliance will be made on philosophical arguments, rather it
will be demonstrated by the Canadian historical example that the
introduction of this type of relationship was the result of an
evolutionary process.
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CHAPTER II

The Trend Towards Bilateral Negotiations in Canada

In February 196? legislation was passed which set up
a framework of collective bargaining in the federal public
service.

This chapter will attempt to assess in an historical

context the Influences and the pressures which ultimately
resulted in this policy decision.
In Canada, Federal public servants have always enjoyed
the rights to both organize staff associations, and then to
make collective representation to the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e s e rights
have rarely been challenged, by the executive, and when they have
been questioned, the queries have been interpreted not as attacks
on staff organizations as such, but rather to any extension of
their power.

An example of this type of attack can be seen in

a statement by Sir George E. Foster when he was acting Prime
Minister in 1920.

His remarks made in the wake of the 1919

Winnipeg Strike were concerned with the right of employee orga
nizations.

He stated that, although the right to organize was

already recognized as applying to industrial workers, "the
principle could not be applied to Government employees, who were

Legislation on the subject of Collective Bargaining in the
public sector consisted of three Acts, "The P u b l i c Service
Staff Relations Act", An Act R especting Employee Relations
in the Public Service of Canada, s".C. ( 1 9 6 7 ) c. 7 2 ; "The
Public Service Employment Act", An Act Respecting Employment
in the Public Service of Canada, S.C., (19&7 )\ c7~7l] 5ncT
An Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act, S.Co,
71967 ). c. 7k,
^ Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessey, Public Management
at the Bargaining Table, Chicago:
Public Personnel
Association, 19^7 > P» 36.
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- 37 obviously in a different category".3

However, when one takes

into account the fact that as early as the late nineteenth
century, the federal employees' associations had begun some
sporadic organizational activity, and that by the time of
Poster's speech in 1920, a number of them were already firmly
established,^ his denial of the right of public servants to
organize, had little relevance.

That is unless his words are

interpreted to take in the broader scope of trade union
activities, which include collective bargaining and strike
action.
The right to group together can be considered, there
fore, an inherent right of our public services.

But organi

zation by itself is of no real importance if the representatives
of the group are denied a responsive ear to which they can voice
their needs and desires.

The lack of such responsiveness on

the part of the government to the requests of the association,
plagued the public service for most of this century, as the

3 ________________ , "Notes on Current Matters of Industrial.
Interest*1,The Labour Gazette, vol. 20 (April, 1920), p, 372.
k

The Federal Civil Servants Association that date their
origin prior to 1920 ares
The Railway Mail Clerks
Association in 1889;
the Federated Association of Letter
Carriers in 1891;
the Civil Service Association of Ottawa
in 1907;
the Association of Canadian Postal Workers in
1911; and the Dominion Mail Clerks Association in 1917.
For a discussion of these early organizations, see Robert
A. Vaison, "Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public
Service:
The Achievement of a Milestone in Personnel
Relations", C.P.A., vol. XII, (Spring, 1969), pp. 108-112.
For a discussion of the environment from which these
organizations evolved, see P.M. Daw-on, The Civil Service
of Canada, London:
Humphrey Mil.ford, 1929*
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development of regularized relations, even on a basis of limited
reciprocity, were slow in maturing*

For example, after the

formation of the two postal organizations in the 1890’s, a letter
was sent to the Postmaster-General requesting a meeting

at

which they could discuss improvements in their pay and working
conditions.

But even though the postal workers had not received

a pay increase in 32 years, and thus had good reason to request
such a meeting "the Postmaster-General replied that he had no
intention of wasting his time meeting with dissident groups of
employees’,’.5
The public servant has always enjoyed the right to
petition the Crown, but the Sovereign authority for a long
time did not consider it necessary, or even proper, to consult
with its servants on matters affecting their conditions for
employment.

Representatives of the various staff organizations

were invited periodically to submit briefs before the various
committees which were established to study the public service,
but they were not permitted to participate in the deliberations
or to be a party to its reports and recommendations.6

The

Government felt that since it alone was responsible to parlia
ment for all governmental activity this precluded the type of
employer-employee relationship which was beginning to evolve
in the sphere of private labour relations.?

^ J.F. Maguire, The Public Service Alliance, Approach to
Collective Bargaining, October 1967, an unpublished research
paper prepared by the Public Service Alliance of Canada.
Saul J. Prankel, Staff Relations in the Civil Service,
Montreal*
McGill University Press, 1962, p. 51«
7 For a discussion of the development of employer-employee
relations in the private sector, see Woods, on.cit., pp. 39-86.
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- 3? This attitude on the part of the Government led to the
Prime Minister and his Cabinet becoming the centre of activity
as far as the public service associations were concerned.

As

a consequence, the Executive became the goal on which the
organizations set their sights when they attempted to initiate
discussions that would lead to favourable changes in employeremployee relations.

In reviewing the association's briefs, the

Government usually followed one of three procedures;

(i) they

would give an immediate reply (ii) they would, inform the
organization that its proposals were under consideration, or,
(iii) they would request that they submit a more detailed brief
to the Civil Service Commission or the -Treasury Board.

Never

theless, whatever the procedure, the final decision was not the
product of direct and detailed, consultations, but was rather
the unilateral decision of the Government.
The associations were aware of their lack of power
and authority, but prior to the Second World War, they were
not in a position to question their inferior statuse

Before the

Civil. Service Act of 1918,® the Public Service had relied to a
large extent on the patronage system to staff the Government
departments.
behaviour,

As this system does not imply tenure during good

it would, ha.ve been extremely foolish on the part of

the public servants to rebel, against the men who had appointed
them to their

positions.^

ment actually was at this

An example

time can

of how p re ca ri ou s e m p l o y 

be seen in

thefact that

O
' S.C., 1918, c. 12.
9 See Dawson, op.cit., p.

27.
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"in the three years following the defeat of' the laurier
Government in 193.1, some 13.,000 civil. servants resigned or
were removed from o f f i c e . " ^

However, with the 3 918 Civil

Service Act, the entire public service, with limited
exceptions,

11

. .
. .
was placed under the supervision of the Civil.

Service Commission.

This enhanced the stability of employ

ment, but before this system was fully able to adjust to the
new conditions, the country was plunged into a depression.*
Another reason for the acquiescent attitude of the association
in the 1920’s was the violent reaction on the part of the
populace to the Winnipeg Strike of 193 9 and all the Communist
connotations that were associated with labour organizations.

1?

10 R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press,' 196 A, p. 273.
I* The Civil Service Act extended to all government employees
except those associated with government railways or working
on government ships. However, the Act did stipulate that
the Civil Service Commission with the permission of the
Governor in Council could dispense with, the normal, proce
dures associated with the merit when it saw fit to do so.
See Statutes of Canada, 1918.
1?

The intensity of the hostility towards labour organizations
that was prevalent among the populace in the 1920’s can be
gauged by the newspaper editorials of the day.
For exampl.e,
on June 30, 1919» an editorial in the Globe and Mail said
"We at least, have no Czar or Kaiser to threaten us with
Siberia or subdue us with the sword, but who knows what we
would have under the regime of a rampant and ’00 3 she vised
Labottr party? ... The pick is no more the sceptre of divine
right than the sword.";
and on May 33» 1921, headlines on
the front page of the G3-obe read. '’U n i o n i s m faces serious
Strike Danger in Strike Order", and this was foil.owed with
a sub-headline which read "Communist Agitators all Under
Surveillance."
The red. scare and the effect it had. on the
public's attitude towards labour, was also brought out in
the Annual Report of the Department of Labour in 1921,
"large numbers look upon the general, labour movement as an
overt act of the tendency such as has been witnessed in
Russia."
See Sessional Parer no. 37» 1921, p. 10.
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During the early 1930's, Bennett attempted to solve
the country's economic ills through the pursuance of a poli cy
that depended on cutting government expenditures to balance the
budget.

This, naturally, had a. detrimental

effect on the

public servants, as both their number and their salaries were
reduced.13

The Government employees realized that this period

of economic restraint was not compatible with a vociferous
movement on their part which demanded a greater voice in
determining their wording conditions and, as a result, they
tended to be passive during this period.

This dormant attitude

was augmented by the fact that people tend to be more co-opera
tive during good times, and the public servants,

even with

their reduction in pay were, in relation to the majority
of the society, fairly well off.

1U

The outbreak of the

Second World War, however, terminated both the period of
economic restraint and the passiveness of the public servants.

i-3 In January 1929, there were *4-2,038 employees in the Federal,
Service, and they earned a total of $ 5 ,**28,058 in that
month, which was an average of $ 129.00 per month for each
employee.
By 193*+> "the total number of employees had fall en
to *4-1,3*4-6 and. they earned a. total of $**,698,536 in the
month of January, and this was only an average of $113.00
per month.
These figures were obtained from the Canada
Year Book 193**-35> F« ^99•
1 Ai*
*
In the manufacturing sector of the economy m 1929> a
total of $812,0*1-9,8*5-2 was paid to 69**>**3** employees;
this was an average of approximately $ 99*00 per month
for- each employee.
In 1-935 tho total n u mb er of omployepp
was only 583>87** and they earned a total of $590,326,90*4which was an average of $8*1.00 per month.
In the civil
service, the depression resulted, in a reduction of the
total number of employees of between one and two percent;
in the manufacturing sector, the decrease was between 16
and 17 percent.
The loss in pay in the private sector
for the employees who were fortunate enough to hold onto
their jobs, was about 15 percent.
The figures for the
above calculations were obtained from the Canada Year
Book 193^-35 and- 19**5*
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In 1916 the British Government had appointed a committee
under the chairmanship of J.H. Whitley to inquire into the
relationship which existed between employers and employees in
the private sector and to make recommendations that would
improve and stabilize the conditions in that sector.

This move

was necessitated because industrial unrest was so prevalennt.
For example, during the war years of 1915 and ]..Ql6 , more than
four and one half million working days were lost as a result
of strikes*1^

The committee made its first report in 1917

and recommended that joint councils be established which would
negotiate the differences which existed between the two sides.
The report was not meant to include the civil service, but
soon after its publication, the President of the Civil Service
Clerical Alliance began to expound the benefits such a system
would have in the public sphere of employment, and in 193 9
Whitley councils were set up In the public sector on the
national level as well as on the departmental level.

The

objectives of these councils were:
To secure the greatest measure of co-operation
between the State in its capacity as employer,
and the general body of civil servants in matters
affecting the Civil Service, with a view to
increase efficiency in the public service com
bined with the
i boium o-c those emr 1oved;
to provide machinery ^or desling with grievances,
and generally to bring together the experiences
and different points of view of representatives
of the administrative, clerical and manipulative

15 See Sir William Armstrong, "Whitleyism in the Civil
Service", Whitley Bulletin, vol. XLIX (September/October,
1969), p. 13^
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Civil Service .~6
The councils, which were made up of an equal num b e r ’
of representatives from the government and the employees, were
to meet regularly to discuss a wide range of issues which
concerned the civil service.

These included problems concerning

conditions of employment such as hours of work, leave, and
allowances.

The councils were primarily advisory bodies and

their recommendations were not considered to be binding,
although quite often their proposals did become operative.
In order to be in the position to enable it to submit a recom
mendation to the government, the council had to first reach
an agreement among its own members;

this consensus was not

achieved by a. majority vote of the entire council, but rather
through an agreement on the issues by its two component parts,
the representatives of the employer and of the employees.

■

If

an agreement could not be reached, the issue remained unresolved
and the Government had to look to alternative methods to solve
the problem.^?
The Canadian public servants in the 1920's looked to
the British example with envious eyes, and to a. degree pressure

16 Richard Hayward, Whitley Councils in the United Kingdom
Civil Service, published by Civil Service National Whitley
Council, Staff Side.
17 F o r a. more c o m p r e h e n s i v e study of the Wh.xt.ley
•
C o u n c i l s see
L.D. White, Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service,
Chicago! University of Chicago Press, 1933° For a discussion
of the Councils and their effectiveness, see 'Leo D. Gagan,
"Recent Transformation in Civil Service Whitleyism", Public
Personnel Review, vol. 12, (January, 19.51)» PP» 25-30, and
Sir William Armstrong, "Whitleyism in the Civil Service",
Whitley Bulletin, vol. XLIX (November, 1 9 6 9 ), pp. 151-155®
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was put on the government to .initiate a similar programme in
Canada.^

In 1926 Mackenzie King utilized this fervour on

the part of the government employees to gain support in the
election of that year, when he went on record publicly advo
cating the establishment

of joint-couneiIs;

I think that in the relations of the Civil
Servi.ce a.nd the Government, a Council on
which there would be representatives of the
Civil Service to speak directly to members
of the Government, or to take up with the
heads of departments, matters of interest
to all government departments, would be of
the utmost service to all concerned* '
After the election, however, King seemed to lose some
of his fervour concerning national councils and nothing was done
until 1928 when J.S. Woodsworth introduced a bill in the House
of Commons which would have authorized the creation of both a
National Council and Departmental councils.

When the bill

came up for second reading on February 10, 1928, King referred
the bill to the Committee on Industrial and International
Relations .^0

The House Committee recommended that the Govern

ment should establish a committee to draw up a constitution
for a National Civil Servi.ce Council.

The Government followed

18 On April-21, 1922. the Hon. James Murdock, the Minister of
Labour, admitted to a question by J.S. Woodsworth, that
"representations had been made to the government for the
introduction of Whitley Councils".
See House of Commons
Debates, 3.922, p. IO 61 .
^

Quoted in Taylor Cole, The Canadian Bureaucracy, Durham,
N.C.i
Duke University Press', 19^9/' p. 12.4".
See House of Commons Debates, 1928, p. 362.
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this recommendation, and in May of I 9 3 O Order in Council number
970 established a committee to draft a constitution for such

a council.
But an election preceded the first meeting- of this
committee; Mackenzie King was defeated by Bennett, and although
the new Prime Minister did not repeal the Order in Council, he
allowed it. to remain inactive.

King's return to office in 3.935

did not enhance the situation, as the Order continued to remain
far down the list of priorities; but with the advent of the war
and the resulting proliferation of public servants the issue
could no longer be ignored.
On February 24, 1Q^+, the Minister of Finance, Hon. J.L.
Ilsley, announced in the House of Commons that the Treasury Board
had decided to establish an "employer-employee council in the
public service in Canada modelled after the pattern which had
evolved in the United Kingdom through the application of so-called
Whitley Councils, to the British Public Service','.

99

The final,

constitution of this council was embodied in a Treasury Board
Minute in March 19^5«
members,

If provided for a total of eighteen

eight representing the official side, and ten repre

senting the staff side; it also all.owed for recommendations to
be made to the Treasury Board, the Civil. Service Commission,
nr the Governor in Council.

However, Finance Minister Ilsley

was emphatic when he stated that "the Co u n c il will of course
have no executive powers which would impair the responsibility

^

In March of 1935 » there were 40,792 pwople employed in the
Federal Service; by March 1Q^1» this figure had mushroomed
to 112,658.
Canada Year Book, 19^5•
House of Commons Debates, 19^l» p* 7?8.
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of the Cabinet, or Treasury Board or Civil Service Commission,
or possibly infringe upon the authority of Parliament'.' *^3

But

even this pronouncement could not dampen the spirits of the
public servants, who for the first time had a forum in which
they could "discuss and consider jointly with officials repre
senting the Government as employer, a wide range of questions
affecting their conditions of work"*

2k

The concept of joint councils was expanded in 19^-8
with the creation of departmental councils, and it appeared
that there would finally b^ v‘nsponsible v-,'vtoT1,)'^ioni, h ^ -^n
^mrl
..

..

end- pnm
"1ovee
at all
1
the
Federal
•' _i '
-j
"
'
" " © v d• s in
•
*
-

Administrati on

But the employees' high hopes in these joint Councils soon
dwindled*

This came about due to a number of factors:

the

Government appeared to put little weight on the activities of
these organizations?

the constant bickering between the various

Staff Associations weakened the employees' position; and, the
central question concerning salaries and wages could not be
discussed by the C o u n c i l . A s

a result, the latter part of

the 19 k O 's and early 1950*s witnessed an increasing amount, of
dialogue on the part of the public servants and their Association

83

Cole, op.cit*, p. 12o.

2k
Heeney Report, Personnel. Administration in the Public Service,
Queen's Printer^ 1 Reprint 1980 , Appendix '"B" Joint Consultation Between Government and Employees Pay and Conditions
of V/ork.
25
For a discussion of these points, See Cole op.cit.,, p 0 128.
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concerning the feasibility of collective ‘bargaining.'''0
However,

in the late 19^0’s and early 1950*3 , the

prevailing opinion in Canada, although under an increasing
amount of pressure, was still that there was no bargaining
with the Crown;

this was not only the official point of view,

but to a large degree also that of the employers.

One reason

for this lacklustre approach towards collective bargaining was
that the labour movement was still involved primarily with
industry "and it took some time before the labour leaders
realized that the growing tertiary, or servi.ce sector, would
be an interesting cl ientelle".2 ^

As a. result, the Staff

Associations, operating in a void of pressure from outside
labour forces, were neither competent nor strong enough by
themselves to undertake such a movement.

Another important

factor was that at this time, unions were primarily associated
with blue-collar workers, and the white-co]lar attitudes of
the public servants tended to regard any associations on their
part with unionism, or any of the connotations attached to it,
as degrading to their station.

The last major cause of the

hesitancy of the public servants towards demanding the extension
of bargaining activity to their sector, can be attributed to the

26 on November 26, 1953, Mr. Claude Ellis brought up in the
House of Commons the question of the extension of bargaining
rights to civil servants:
"I think t h e t i m e h a s o o m o in
this country when we should recognize that there is a
better method of carrying on employer«employee relations.
We have got beyond the concept of master and servant ..."
See the House of Commons Debates 1953 * P» 332-> The unrest
in the Civil Service was also brought out in an article by
0. Glenn Stahl,
"The Horizon of Personnel Administration".
Public Personnel Review, vol. 13 , (July, 1952)> P* -106.
27 Bolduc, op.clt., p. 13*
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fact that the government employees at this time had frown up
and had been educated during the depress.! on and the Second
World War and, as a consequence, they knew what hard times
meant and they did not want another conflict, this time with
their employers®

But as the fifties drew to a close "many

forces that were latent, or that had worked in isolated fashion,
pQ
gained impetus",
and a concentrated effort aimed at the
attainment of collective bargaining was launched.
By the late 1950's, discontent was .growing at an
unprecedented rate in the public service.^'9
"The demand (for change) had developed slowly
during the postwar period.
When the Industrial
Relations and Disputes Investigation Act was
passed in 19^8 there was no apparent desire on
the part of the P u b l i c Service employer organiza
tions to have their relationship with the Govern
ment regulated by the legislation.
Within a few
years it was being argued by some associations
that the Public Service should be brought within
0
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lb id., p. 13*

2 9 The unrest in the public sector in this period can be measured
by a number of factors:
by the merger of the Amalgamated and
the Civil Service Association of Ottawa in 1958; by the appoint
ment of a Pay Research Bureau in 19575 by the appointment of a
Committee to study the public service; by the numerous announce
ments in the House of Commons; by the opposition, advocating
the extension of collective bargaining to the public sec tor •> I
example of this last point can be seen in a speech by Mr. Bodan
in the House of Commons on May id, 1959!
" I si.ig.gost the
Minister of Labour should, recommend to his cabinet colleagues
that the time has come to place all workers or the civil
service below the executive rank, on the same footing as
workers who are employed in industry, and that they be given
the same bargaining rights as any other group", see House
of Commons Debates, 1959> P» 3868.
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specifically for the Public Service would be
pref erable. "30
The introduction of the National. Joint Councils

had

placated the public service temporarily, and the formation of
the Pay Research Bureau in 1 9 5 7 ^ which was instituted in an
effort to affect one of the major shortcomings of the Councils,
also hah a tempering effect, but the problems which existed in
the Civil Service went far deeper than either of these two
bodies could hope to reach.
For approximately forty years government employees
had been forced to live with the then present Civil Service
Act, despite the fact that during this per? od Canada had experienced
momentous changes which had a great effect on the National Public
Servi.ce.
Population had more than doubled.
The immense
expansion of commerce and industry throughout
the nation had been accompanied by significant
developments in labour-management relations...
During this period, too, Canadians had evolved
their own concepts of the responsibility of
the state f o r the welfare of i.ts citizens.-^
But these
service;

extensive changes had little effect on the public
the public servants continued to work under the

weak

and vague provisions outlined by the 1916 Civil Service Act
even though it was "legally deficient in making provisions for

30 Rerort of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargain?ny
in the Public Service, July 1965, P« K ”*
3^ See ibid., p. 1? for a limited discussion on this bureau»
3 2 The Civil Service Commission’s Report "Personnel Administration
in the Public Service", quoted in Canadian Public Administration,
edited by Hodgetts and Corbett, Toronto's
Macmillan Company,
I 960, p.’ 268.
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many of the so-called fringe benefits provided by good employers
today”

The Government, realizing this unrest,

instructed

the Civil Service Commission to "review the Civil Service

Act

and regulations and examine the role of the Commission in the
machinery of government".3^
The Keeney Commission35 conducted a detailed study and,
as result of its investigation, made a number of recommendations.
There have been a number of statements ma.de concerning these
proposals, but none as appropriate as one by J.C.

B e s t .

36

Unlike good wine, the document known as
Personnel Administration in the Public Service,
has not improved with age.
When first intro
duced early in 1959 the Report was acclaimed by
the newspapers and others as being the fore
runner of a new Bill of Rights for Civil
Servants, and the gateway to the best of all
possible worlds.
Today, some fourteen months
later, there are many of us who look at the
report with considerable misgivings.'''
Appendix "B" of the Heeney Commission has been the
target of most of the criticism levelled at it.

This section

33 Harold Bowen, "The Heeney Report", Collective Bargaining in
the Public Service, Fredericton, N.B.s
Canadian Labour
Congress, 1960, p7 1.
35The Civil Service Commission Report, Hodgetts and Corbett:
op.clt., p. 2 6 d.
35 The correct name for the Heeney Report is the Report of the
Civil Service Commission of Canada on Personnel Administration
in the Public Service.
Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1956,
(reprinted i9 6 0 ).
3 d Mr. Best was, at that time, President of the Civil Service
Association of Canada.
33 J.C. Best, "The Heeney Report", Collective Bargaining in
the Public Service, Fredericton, N.B.;
Canadian Labour
C o n g r e s s , i Q o O , p7 1.
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recommended that on matters other than salaries and wages, the
National Joint Council should he the forum for discussion and
the body that should forward all recommendations direct1y to
the government.

As far as wages and salaries were concerned,

the Report recommended that machinery he set up for joint
consultation between the ”representntivras c ’7’
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associations on the other"-^ i,n order that th^y "could discuss
in systematic fashion, questions of salary and wages in govern
ment employment!-'*39

These meetings, the report suggested,

would he chaired by an officer of the Civil Service Commission
and after frank discussions between the two sides, the Civil
Service Commission would make its recommendations to the
Government, and forward a. copy of its proposals to the Staff
Associations *^0
This section attracted the hulk of the criticism due
to the fact that it did not deal with the problems concerning
salaries and wages in a realistic fashion.
"The type of collective consultation which the
three commissioners recommended, was one in
which the Civil Service Commission would sit at
the end of a table in a somewhat detached capa
city, the representatives of the civil service
organizations and associations would sit on one
side, and representatives of the Treasury Board
would sit on the other, and there would be
discussions."

38
^ Heeney Report, Appendix "B", op.cit., paragraph 7*
39 Ibid., paragraph ?•

Ibid., paragraphs 8 , 9> 10.
Al
' Hon. Donald. M. Fleming, House of Commons Debates,
t>. 3879.

19bO-6l »
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The inadequacies of this proposal were brought out
clearly by a Member of Parliament when he stated:
I have not been impressed with the provisions
of Appendix B of the Heeney Report.
It is naive
in its assumptions and to my Tinders tan ding,
it completely ignores the legitimate aspirations
of the employee.
It has all the weaknesses of
a unilateral compromise In that it fails
completely to appreciate the need for partici
pation in employment matters that now exists.
It is too much conerned with maintaining out
moded traditional concepts that are useless
in i960 . ^
The inadequacy of the recommendations set forth were
apparent even before the report was published.

In May 195'°’>

the Pay Research Bureau submitted a brief to the Treasury
Board; this report was followed by joint consultations between:
the three main Staff Associations and members of the Treasury
Board and senior Government officials.

These consultations

were chaired by a Civil Service Commissioner.

Each party

involved was given an opportunity to state its case and, in
addition, time was allowed for informal arguments by individuals.
These meetings were followed by the Civil Service Commission
presenting to the Government,

its recommendations for a salary

revision to be effective October 1, 1958.

The above procedure

was identical with the one outlined in the Heeney Report except
for the fact that the Staff Associations were not supplied
with a copy of the commissioner's recommendations.

The result

of these responsible discussions was t h a t t he g o v e r n m e n t n o t
only turned down the recommendations, but even refused to make
them public.

^

Civil Servants across the country were shocked by

Quoted in Best, op.cit., p. 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

53

-

this treatment, and demands were made to the Central

offices of

the Staff Associations, demanding some type of action„

The

Staff Associations petitioned the Minister of Labour and
"expressed themselves quite forcibly on the subject and indi
cated that this kind of system did not meet with their views".^'3
The organizations also responded to this pressure from their
rp ojrV' pv.n.j^ ^ -v",

rj 3 ^ <r

m I -*'')^ * O

ties across the country,

'i ^

f) ’' r5 r"* ^

^

IP

G

T)**'*'3 ^ C 9 "O ^ °

in an attempt to educate the public

on the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n . ^
Joint Action Committee in 1959*

They also initiated a

the aim of this body was to

co-ordinate activity among the various staff associations in
order that they could have a united front.^'5
The Government reacted to this crowing discontent by
introducing a bill in i960 which would have revised the Civil
Service Act.

However, at the request of several groups who

wanted more time to study it, the Government, withdrew the
motion,^

d-3

In 1961 it re-introduced it*

The Bill C-71 wa.s

House of Commons Debates, op.cit.

kk

Bolduc, op.cit,, p. Ik,

£1

^

Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining
op.cit., p. l£.
Mr. Caron, a Liberal Member of Parliament, was instrumental
in obtaining the delay in the legislation.
The government
was attempting to push a. Civil Servi.ce Act through in the
latter part of the session and Mr. Caron attacked this move
in the House of Commons.
"He, (Minister of Finance will not
even a],low civil servants and civil service organizations
enough time to give it (Civil Service Act) ad equate consi
deration, or give them an opportunity to appear before the
committee and make recommendation." House of Commons
Debates, June 20, i 960 , p. 5-13?.*
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to become the Givi]. Service Act of 396.I0

The bill woe referred

to the House of Commons Special Committee on the Civil Service
Act and the employee organisations were invited to present
briefs.

"Most of them wanted direct negotiations with the

Government.

Eschewing the strike, they were in favour of

settling disputes by arbitration."^?

However, the briefs by

these organizations were not well presented and often conflicted
with each other.

These slip-shod presentations demonstrated to

the House Committee the fact "that the staff associations

had

not really thought through the implications of full.-blown
collective bargaining and it was not what most of them wanted".^8
As a result, the Government was able to take a firm position
and the new Civil Service Act received Royal Assent with provisions
for consultations only, with the Staff Organizations.
These provisions, however, proved, only to be a. stop
gap measure, as the Staff Associations soon discovered that
their right to consult with the Civil Service Commission and
with senior personnel designated by the Minister of Finance,
was not very practical, because although they could consult all
they wanted to, it was the Government,
which made the decisions.

in the final analysis,

As a result, the Staff Associations

once again began to press for collective bargaining.

In 3.963,

for example, they formulated the Staff Side Council for Collective

U-?

Robert Armstrong, "Some Aspects of Policy Determination
in the Development of the Collective 'Bargaining Legislation
in the Public Service of Canada", Canadian Public
Adm.in 1 strati 0n , vol. XI (Winter, I 96S ), pp. AS'5-^93♦

1+8 Ibid., p. ^87.
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Bargaining in the Public Service*

The breaking point in their

fight came just prior to the IQ 63 election, when C.A. Edwards,
the President of the Civil Service Federation of Canada, took
the Initiative and wrote the leaders of Canada's national
political parties asking them to clarify the official position
of their respective parties "on the quest] on of the principle
of negotiation and arbitration for the civil service and the
specific proposals of the Civil Service Federation for a
negotiation procedure in the civil service"

The responses

of the parties were generally favourable towards the introduction
of some type of bargaining.-’
With the Liberal victory in 19^3, Mr* Pearson acted
swiftly to honour the cause he had committed his party to,
prior to the election.

He established a preparatory committee

on collective bargaining in August 1963, with Arno]d Heeney as
Chairman.

The task of this committee was to "make preparations

for the introduction into the Public Service of an appropriate
form of collective bargaining and arbitration, and to examine
the need for reforms in the system of classification and pay
applying to civil servants and prevailing rate employees".5^

^9 Ibid., p* d-88*

50 This outright request to the leaders of the political
parties for their position on oollootiv/' h.>•■!•►>■■-nuing
•! L o p ]

i p

o r '

■’

v '*/''1

C 1 ~*r 1 ] C

^ V1

h o p f l . i l r* o

’h h p v

C O ]'"*

not afford to c.li enate over ld-0,000 voters during; an
election campaign. As a result, their responses were
favourable towards the concept of collective bargaining.
Preparatory Committee, op.cit., p. 1.
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The preparatory committee consulted with the various
staff associations and also a number of trade uni ons before it
made its report in July, 1965°

In this report it proposed a

structural method of collective bargaining in the Federal Servic
similar to that existing in private industry.
sector,

As in the private

it suggested that bargaining should be a two party-

process; the Treasury Board, it proposed, should be considered
the employer in all negotiations to facilitate the process,
while the bargaining agents on the other hand, would represent
bargaining units established in relation to classes or groups
of employees to whom a pay plan applied;
nkng units were recommended,5^

sixty-six such bargai-

The committee also proposed

binding arbitration on the employers, but reserved to the
government the right to reject an award when the national
interest was at stake.

The Preparatory Committee, however,

did not specifically condemn strike action and a group of
militant postal workers took advantage of this and went on a
strike, July 18, 1965, shortly after the report was issued to
back up their demands to the Government,
The Government reacted to this by requesting that a ID.
interested parties submit briefs to them concerning the proposal
of the Preparatory Committee.

This resulted in approximately

75 amendments to the proposed 1 egislation suggested by the
Preparatory Committee,

The two mo a i. important cbangoc brought

about by this review of the Preparatory Committee recommendation
were the means to review conflict resolution and the power of
reservation which the Committee had given to the Government.
52 gee Appendix A for a discussion of the reclassification
system.
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- 57 These changes which were instituted at this time, especially
the clause to allow strike action, can he seen as important
policy decisions which were made at the discretion oT the
executive branch of Government.
The final draft of the bill introduced into Parliament
was tailored to meet the aim of the legislation as defined by
the Government, which was "to preserve the capacity of the
public service to function efficiently in serving the people
of Canada"
Various pressures, including the environment as
prescribed by established norms and economic conditions, the
needs and aspirations of the public servants and their organi
zations, public opinion, the activities of the opposition
parties and interested groups, and the goals of government,
as pointed out in the above discussion, all played a vital
role in setting the stage for the legislation#
was ripe for government action.

By 1966 the time

The result was legislation

which culminated the trends which had been present in the society
since the turn of the century.

The course of action the govern

ment could pursue was clearly defined..

It could have possibly

introduced piecemeal legislation to placate the public servants
but it would only have been a temporary measure.

The various

pressures in society demanded the introduction of’ meaningful
bilateral negotiations and the policy alternatives of the
executive by 1966 were extremely limited.

The time was ripe;

it had be ripened by the historical process outlin ed above, and
the government merely consummated, this trend.

53 Lester Pearson, Debates, August 1 963 # p«
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Chapter III

Collective Bargaining in the American Public Sector

Prom the discussion in the previous chapter it appears
as though the road to bilateral negotiations was an evo
lutionary one in the field of labour-management relations
in the public sector.

In Canada, employee organizations

have been actively engaged in eroding the once powerful
position of the sovereign power since before the turn of
the century.

Today this erosion has reached the extent

that the Canadian Government, like most other modern govern
ments, has agreed to limit its sovereignty by engaging in
some type of collective bargaining activity.

This move

towards bilateral negotiations, however, was not only pre
cipitated through the pressures exerted by the employee
organizations but also through a realization on the part
of management that stability could be better achieved by
introducing into the staff relations area a structured
form of negotiations.

It realized that negotiations would

allow for the utilization of the knowledge and the genius
of the employees while at the same time providing an open
line of communications that would allow management to stay
abreast of discontent and alienation in order that it
could formulate appropriate policies before a disruption
occurred.
Negotiations, therefore, have a very important role
in staff relations in the public sector.

But what line

should these negotiations follow and within what boundaries
should they be conducted?

It is my hypothesis, as pointed
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out in the introduction, that in order to have negotiations
that do in fact help to create stability it is necessary
to embody the basic framework of collective bargaining into
the public sector context.

This is not to say that there

has to be a wholesale transplant of the practices and pro
cesses discussed in chapter IIj only that the basic inter
actions of the process must be reproduced if the beneficial
aspects of the system are to be transferred to the public
sector.

Stability can only be achieved in the public

sector through a well structured process of bilateral
negotiations, and since this process was developed in the
private sector within a collective bargaining framework,
with a large measure of success, it stands to reason that
the basic framework of collective bargaining should be put
to work in the public sector.

Once this model of bargaining

is transplanted it will develop and foster its own out
growths and trappings which will be compatible to the
public environment.
In order to show the validity of this thesis, I will
discuss the American and Canadian experiences with bilateral
negotiations in the public sector at the federal level. My
discussion of the experiences of these two countries in
this field will show that the successes and failures of
these experiments are directly related to the degree that
they have embodied or failed to embody the basic framework
of collective bargaining.
But before I apply the outline developed in chapter I
to the American situation it would be useful to first give
a brief history of staff relations in the American civil
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service to bolster the claim made in chapter II that the
introduction of collective bargaining was an evolutionary
process*
In August, 1912, the Lloyd-La Follette Act was passed
and it established the right of persons employed in the
civil service of the United States, "either individually
or collectively, to petition Congress or any member thereof,
or to furnish information to either House of Congress or
1
to any committee or member thereof".
This act was relatively
progressive for its day as it provided for both the right
of the federal employee to be heard by his employer and
his right to join employee organizations.

It did not,

however, grant the employee organizations any rights of
their own which were distinct from those of individual
employees; consequently, the ability of these organizations
to represent their members did not rest on any rights
granted to them by a legislative body but rather on the
degree of sufferance they received from the various
departments.
Meaningful negotiations 2
in this type of environment.

were therefore impossible

As argued above it is impe

rative that negotiations take place in a bilateral
setting, and as long as the government did not recognize

1

Lloyd-La Follette Act, 37 Stat. 555* quoted in Hart,
op.cit., p. 33 *

2

Meaningful negotiations is a technical term which implies
that negotiations cover all the important aspects of
employer-employee relations.
A discussion of the scope
of the relationships which are incorporated in the
meaning of this term is given in chapter I, pp. 24-29.
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the employee organizations as instruments of negotiation,
regularized patterns of staff relations "based on criteria
other than paternalism and unilateralism were not possible.
The employees in the federal civil service realized this,
and as a consequence sought enactment of legislation that
would amend the Lloyd-La Follette Act "in order to provide
more effective statutory recognition of organizations of
federal employees".^

For example, during the period

between 19^9 and 1961 approximately eighty bills were
introduced in Congress on the subject of union recognition.^
Although a number of these bills were favourably reported
by the House and Senate committees they were never brought
to a vote in either House of Congress.
The inability of the supporters of these bills to
bring them to a vote was due primarily to a number of
preconceived notions held in the Congress and in the nation
at large.

These widespread misconceptions of government

employment were that (1 ) public employees were so well
taken care of by the governmental parent they served that
they did not need to band together to achieve better
working conditions!

(2 ) collective bargaining was not

shown to be as necessary in public employment as it was in

3

W.B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the United States
Federal Civil Service, Cornell University, Ph.D. 19^5>
University Microfilms Inc., p. 80.

^

The two chief exponents in Congress of this drive for
union recognition were Representative George M. Rhodes
of Pennsylvaniz (D) and Senator Olin D. Johnston of
South Carolina (D).
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private industrial life because the public environment was
sheltered, to a large degree, from the market influences
that played havoc on employment conditions and standards
in the private se c t o r ; ^

(3)

the state was considered to

be a sovereign power, a sort of transcendental unique
force

that would be threatened by any comparison with

private institutions especially private employment and its
£

practices*
However, these notions of government employment were
extremely unrealistic as they ignored the fact that since
the war the government had been faced with an ever increasing
demand load from the civil service.

But the increase in

the number of demands was not the only new post-war charac
teristic of the civil service;

the methods by which the

employees sought to achieve their ends, including greater
militancy and persistency, was also new.?

The government,

in order to combat these new demands and techniques, went
on the defensive.

Instead of trying to introduce new pro

grammes and techniques that would dispel the old notions
of government e m p l o y m e n t and which would establish a new

5

For a discussion of market influences and the public
sector see Gordon T. Nesvig, "The New Dimension of the
Strike Question", Public Administration Review, vol. 28
(April, 1968), pp. 130-131.

6

For a discussion of why public employees were excluded
from participation in labour policies that had evolved
in private industry see Ida Klaus, "Past, Present and
Some Prognostications", Personnel Report. #662, Public
Personnel Association, editor, Keith Ocheltree, p. 1.

7

For a discussion of the dissatisfaction and restlessness
in the post-war period in the public sector see Rollin
B. Posey, "The New Militancy of Public Employees", Public
Administration Review, vol. 28 (April, 1968), pp. H i - 117.
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framework that would utilize the militancy and enthusiasm
of the civil servants hy bringing them within the system,
the government chose to safeguard its traditional approach.
Rather than change their methods of dealing with managementlabour problems the government decided to institutionalize
legal restrictions aimed at curbing the activities of the
employee organizations.
The federal government bolstered the Lloyd-La Follette
Act's implicity clauses banning strike action by civil
servants with specific clauses in the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947.

The government then found it necessary to bolster

this reinforced stance in 1955 "by making it a felony for
federal employees to strike.

8

But it soon became apparent

that the government could not solve the problem of uneasy
personnel relations in the public sector by legalistic
means which were not embodied in a bargaining framework.9
With this realization the government was stimulated to
seek out better ways to achieve the necessary stability in
this sector.

The avenue the executive branch of govern

ment chose to pursue towards this end was the one stressing
joint determination of employer-employee relationships
through the process of negotiations and collective bargaining.
8

For a discussion of Public Law 330 see Warner, Hennessey,
op. cit., p. 76.

9

During the Eisenhower administration the cabinet was split
on the desirability of revising the government's labourmanagement policy in the public sector to embody a bi
lateral approach. But by 1958 the future course of action
had settled itself because by then it was apparent that
some type of bilateral approach was necessary if stability
was going to be maintained. This can be seen in the
fact that the official opposition to employee organi
zations which had characterized the administrations of
both Truman and Eisenhower was forced to undergo radical
review in 1958. The outcome of this review can be seen
in Rocco Siciliano's memorandum which is discussed below.
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In 1958, the first major sign of the coming realign
ment in labour-management relations was seen when Rocco
Siciliano, the Special Assistant to President Eisenhower
for Personnel Management, sent a letter to all departments
and agency heads advising each of them to "evaluate the
personnel management activities of his own agency with
respect to employee-management relations, including relations
with employee organizations.
But by 1960 advisory statements such as the one above
were not sufficient;

the matter of staff relations could

no longer be put off by placating the staff associations
with executive policies that attempted to reform conditions
within the present framework.

What was needed by i 960 , if

widespread labour discontent and instability were to be
averted, was a whole new framework of labour-management
relations that recognized the utility of the bargaining
process.

It is likely that if the Democratic leadership

which came to the White House in 1961 had continued the
policy of official opposition towards the representatives
of the federal employees chaos would have more than likely
resulted in the public sector.

But President Kennedy did

not follow the traditional role of opposing the establish
ment of a new and more realistic set of ground rules
regulating employer-employee relations.

He acknowledged

both the problem that existed in this area and the urgency

10

Quoted in Vosloo, op. cit., p. 99.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65
of it by appointing a task force in 1961 which was to report
back to the executive no later than November 30 of that
year.

The task force was appointed to investigate the

question of Mhow to improve practices which will assure
the rights and obligations of employees, employee organ
izations and the Executive Branch in pursuing the objective
of effective labour-management co-operation in the public

11
service.”

But even before the task force reported,

President Kennedy in a letter to all departments gave
advance notice of the changes that were to come.
The right of all employees of the
Federal government to join and participate
in the activities of employee organizations
and to seek to improve working conditions
and the resolution of grievances should
be recognized by management officials at
all levels in all departments and agencies.
The participation of Federal employees
in the formulation and implementation of
employee policies and procedures affecting
them contributes to the effective conduct
of public business.
I believe this participation should
include consultations by responsible
officials with representation of employees
and Federal employee organizations. 12
Finally, on January 17, 1962 President Kennedy issued
Executive Order 10988 which formalized, for the first time,
a structured form of collective bargaining in the American
public sector.

The following discussion of Executive Order

11

White House Memorandum from President to Heads of
Departments and Agencies, Subject* Employee-Management
Relations in the Federal Service, June 22, 1961,
quoted in ibid., p. 108.

12

Quoted in M. B. Nesbitt, The Civil Service Merit System
and Collective Bargaining, New York University, Ph.D.
1962, University Microfilms Inc., p. 125.
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10988 will, as pointed out earlier, centre around its
adaptability

to the basic framework of collective bar

gaining which was developed in chapter I.
Executive Order IO 988 granted federal employees the
right to form, join and assist any employee organization,
and conversely it also granted them the right to refrain
from participating in these organizations in any fashion
whatsoever!^ The order then allowed for recognition of
these employee organizations on one of three levels*
exclusive recognition, formal recognition, or informal
recognition.

Exclusive recognition is to be given to an

employee organization that satisfies three basic criteria;
one, it has a stable membership of at least 10 per cent in
lit
an appropriate unit;
two, it has been designated or

13

The right to join and/or to assist an employee organ
ization is subject to the scrutiny of management, who
can claim that the official duties of an employee
constitutes a conflict of interest with membership in
either an employee organization or its management,
and as a result can bar his membership.
There is no
appeal for the employee who is so designated except
to the official who made the original decision.
See
Executive Order 10988, Section (6).

14

The question of what constitutes an appropriate bar
gaining unit is left to the discretion of each depart
ment and agency. The employee organization may ask
the Secretary of Labour to investigate their claims
for recognition as a bargaining unit but his role as
an arbitrator is only an advisory one to the depart
ment or agency.
This is in contrast to the private
sector where the appropriateness of a bargaining unit
is determined by an independent board, usually the
State Labour Relations Board.
These independent
boards play an important role in the bargaining pro
cess as they ensure an existence for each part that is
independent of the other.
When one side is dependent
on the other for its formal existence, as is the case
in the American public sector, it cannot help but
weaken the collective bargaining framework.
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- 67 selected by a majority of the employees of the unit as their
representative;*5 and three, it has submitted to the agency
or department in which it is located a roster of its officers
and representatives, a copy of its constitution and by-laws
and a statement of its objectives.

1£>

Once given exclusive

recognition by the agency or department the employee organi
zation is entitled for a period of at least twelve months to
act for and negotiate agreements covering all the employees
in the unit.
Formal recognition is granted to organizations that satisfy
all the criteria required for exclusive recognition except the
one requiring a majority of supporters within the bargaining
unit.

Informal recognition is given to any employee organization

which does not qualify for exclusive or formal recognition
because of its size or the status of other organized groups
in the unit.
What this tripartite method of recognition means is that
unless exclusive recognition is granted to an employee organi
zation within a bargaining unit there cannot be any bilateral
15
A majority of members means at least 50 per cent of the
votes cast are in favour of exclusive recognition with
a minimum of 60 per cent of the members within the bar
gaining unit voting.
This is in contrast to the private
sector where only a majority of those voting is required.
1 f\

This information is required because the order stipulates
that organizations that (1) recognize the right to strike,
(2) advocate the overthrow of the government, or (3) discri
minate with regards to the terms or condition of membership
because of race, colour, creed or national origin, are not
to be recognized. Also the "Standards of Conduct for
Employee Organizations and Code of Fair Labor Practices",
which was a Presidential Memorandum supplementing the
Executive Order, "requires employee organizations to main
tain standards of conduct that ensure democratic procedures
and practices and requires them to exclude Communists, other
totalitarians and corrupt persons". Warner, Hennessey,
op.cit., p. 73*
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negotiations that affect the entire unit.

In other words,

negotiations between management and labour will have to be
conducted on several different planes with no overall policy
being evolved that will cover all the employees.

But not

only is there no written agreement covering all the employees,
there is no written agreement covering any of the employees
in the unit because since no one organization represents
all the employees, management is not required to negotiate
a written agreement.

Management is required by law only to

consult with formal organizations and to hear briefs from
them, but nothing concrete as far as binding agreements can
come out of these negotiations.

Informal organizations, on

the other hand, do not even enjoy free access to management
for consultation but can only put forth their views "to the
extent (that is) consistent with the efficient and orderly
conduct of public business".
It would seem then that the bilateral negotiations
which are a prerequisite for a meaningful bargaining frame
work are only possible when an employee organizations is
granted exclusive recognition.

But even this is not exactly

true because when an employee organization is granted exclu
sive recognition, bargaining on a strict bilateral basis
can still not take place.

The Executive Order requires

that all negotiated agreements must be approved by the head
of the department or agency in which the bargaining unit
is located or by an official designated by him.^®

^

Executive Order IO 988, Section 4 (6).
Executive Order IO 988, Section ?•
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Management negotiators cannot make final and binding agree
ments at the bargaining table?

they must refer all

decisions up to top management.

In the private sector the

role of the negotiator is distinct from the organizational
hierarchy of his firm or department, and this allows him
to engage in responsible and relevant negotiations because
his statements have a fair amount of credibility and
meaning.
ease?

In the American public sector this is not the

the result of the role of the negotiator not being

distinct from the organizational hierarchy of the depart
ments is that his role as a responsible unit in the bar
gaining process is negated.

The referal of decisions

places a great deal of stress on the concepts of bilateral
and of efficacious negotiations both of which play a vital
role in the bargaining framework developed in chapter I.
This has proven to be a major shortcoming in the American
situation, as the unions have been complaining that "agency
heads are second guessing local officials and are overrestrictive in delegating sufficient authority to the
local levels to permit meaningful negotiations.
The discussion of recognition and the role of manage
ment showed that in the area of bilateral negotiations the
Executive Order failed to duplicate the basic mechanisms
of the bargaining framework.

The second place that the

proposals of Executive Order 10988 run into conflict with
the basic framework of collective bargaining is in the
area of pertinent negotiations.

19

Arvid Anderson, "The U. S. Experience in Collective Bar'
gaining in Public Employment", editor Warner, op. cit«.
p. 27•
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Meaningful negotiations basically implies two things;
first, that negotiations take place on all the major areas
that affect the relationship between management and labour,
and second, that the negotiations on these topics are con
ducted in a responsible fashion.
As shown above2® negotiations in the private sector extend
to all the important matters affecting the relationship between
labour and management.

These included wages and wage supple

ment programmes, working time, seniority and job rights, and
operating rules and industrial jurisprudence.21

In the public

sector in the United States at the federal level the breadth
of negotiable items is not nearly as broad as in the private
sector.

The scope of the negotiations depends to a large

degree on the form of union recognition that is afforded to
the employee organization, but since the breadth of negotiable
items broadens from a narrow base at the informal level to an
all-inclusive one at the exclusive level the discussion can
be concentrated on this latter tier.
Exclusive recognition means that one employee organization
serves as the spokesman to management for all employees included
in the unit; consequently, management must negotiate and reach
an agreement only with it.

But the areas which this exclusive

organization can negotiate on are fairly limited.

The

Executive Order states explicitly that negotiable matters shall

not extend "to such areas of discretion and policy as the
mission of an agency, its budget, its organization and the

Chapter 1, pp. 24-29.
21

Supra,
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assignment of its personnel, or the technology of performing
its work”.22

This means that the employee organizations are

not permitted ”to negotiate on wages, retirement, insurance,
annual and sick leave, and holidays because these decisions
are made by Congress”.23

The employees, then, have no say

on the matters which are considered to be the core of vital
ones in the private sector;

they are restricted to negotiation

on secondary matters such as grievances, personnel policy and
practices, and matters affecting working conditions such as
overtime distribution, car allowance, call in and wash-up
o

Jl

time, apprentice shop councils and the like.
But not only are the employee organizations required
to bargain in a limited field of activity, they are also
forced to operate under the further restriction that
...in the administration of all matters
covered by the agreement officials and
employees are governed by the provisions
of any existing or future laws and regu
lations, including policies set forth
in the Federal Personnel Manual and
agency regulations which may be applic
able, and the agreement shall at all
times be applied subject to such laws,
regulations and policies. ^
In transplanting the framework of collective bargaining
from the private sector to the public sector the area of
negotiable items underwent a severe transformation, as it
was both narrowed and put on a very unsteady foundation.

22
J

Executive Order 10988, Section 6 (6).
Warner, Hennessey, op.cit., p. 80.

^

Ibid., p. 80.

25

Executive Order 10988, Section 7 (!)•
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result is a great deal of discontent, as the employee organi
zations feel that in order to have responsible negotiations,
and hence a stable relationship, the scope of negotiable items
must be expanded.
The second meaning implicit in the phrase meaningful
negotiations is that negotiations are conducted in a respon
sible fashion.

Similar to the private sector attempts to

safeguard the responsibility criteria of negotiations are
made through legislative means.

rI
'y

In the private sector

standards of negotiations are safeguarded through various
legislative acts?

these include the Wagner Act of 1935*

the Taft-Hartley Act of 19^7* and the Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959*

If one °f fhe two parties engaged in the bargaining

process breaks one of the regulations embodies in one of
these acts the other has recourse to the courts.

In the

public sector an attempt was made in 19^3 to inculcate a
similar framework of responsibility with the passage of
the Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and,
Code of Fair Labour Practices in the Federal Service, by
executive order.

The Standards are designed to impose

upon union and management in the federal sphere the same
responsibilities required of similar structures in the
private sector.

Labour is required to work within a given fO

framework which includes the maintenance of democratic
procedures and practices, the exclusion from union office
of communists or corrupt persons, the prohibition of con
flict of interest on the part of union officials, and the
maintenance of fiscal integrity.

Management on the other
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hand is prohibited from interfering with employee rights
under the Order, including the encouragement or discourage
ment of union membership by discrimination; the provision
of assistance to union;

the discrimination against

employees for having filed a grievance; refusal to grant
to the employee organizations the recognition which they
qualify for; and refusal to negotiate, consult or bargain
with a union as required by Executive Order IO988.
On paper it appears is if the legislative guidelines
which safeguard responsible negotiations in the private
sector have been transplanted to the public sector.
this is not really the case.

But

In the public sector there

is no effective means the employee organizations can use
to force an agency or department to comply to these
standards.
An employee organization which feels an
agency has violated the Code of Fair
Labour Practices may file a charge against
the agency. The agency does not have to
conduct a hearing on the charge unless
it finds there is a "substantial basis
for complaint". If the agency decides
to hold a hearing, it must name an im
partial hearing officer, who may be one
of the agency's own employees. Manage
ment acts as defendant, judge and jury
all at the same time.
If management is found to have vio
lated the Code, Section 3^ of the Code
directs the agency to immediately take
necessary action in accordance with the
decision to remedy the violation. If
the agency refuses to take corrective
action, the Code allows no recourse
for the employee organization.^5

26

Warner, Hennessey, op.cit., p. 83*

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-

74

-

On the other hand if the employee organization violates
the Code, management can suspend or revoke the recognition
of the organization.
This is not an equitable arrangement, nor is it one
which is conducive to responsible negotiations.

Therefore,

the introduction of a collective bargaining framework into
the American public sector can be seen to be lacking an
other basic mechanism which is essential to its operation.
The third major area where the model of collective
bargaining is thwarted in the American public sector is in
the area of conciliating differences between management and
labour.

In the private sector impasses between the two

are solved through a variety of means which may include
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, industrial welfare,
or any combination of these.

In the American public sec

tor however, there are no procedural rules or processes
pO

such as these to resolve impasses in bargaining.

If

there is an issue that cannot be agreed upon by management
and labour then there is no agreement.

Management in the

bargaining process has the final sayj if it approves the
agreement it is signed, if it does not then it has to go
back to bargaining until an agreement is submitted which
is conducive to the wishes of management.
2?

For a thorough discussion of the Code see Yosloo,
op. cit., pp. 149-152.

28

Although there is no structured method to solve impasses
in the public sector generally, a number of departments
and agencies have voluntarily agreed to submit to a
process of mediation. Anderson claims that approximately
10 per cent of the current collective agreements in the
federal service provide for mediation. Anderson, op.cit.,
p. 27. However, it must be remembered that management
still has the final say as it can disregard any previous
commitment made if it is in conflict with its 'mission*.
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No agreements are valid unless approved
by top management and they are to be made
with the understanding that in emergency
situations a government activity must be
free to take whatever actions are neces
sary to carry out its mission, regardless
of prior commitments. To the same effect,
all arbitration decisions are advisory.
There is no provision for the arbitration
of negotiation impasses.29
The prerogative of not signing an agreement is not
unique to the public sector;

in the private sector an

agreement does not become enforceable until both the
representatives of management and the bargaining unit have
signed it.

But if management refuses to sign the agreement

in the private sector the union has recourse to a number
of weapons which can be used to apply pressure and make it
either too costly for management not to sign, or necessary
through a process of binding arbitration.

In the public

sector in the United States at the federal level no such
pressure can be exerted on management, and as a consequence
it is not under any real pressure to make concessions.
The fourth place where the application of the frame
work of collective bargaining to the public sector breaks
down is in the area of contract adjudication.

In the pri

vate sector a fairly standardized grievance procedure has
evolved which allows for binding arbitration by an impartial
arbitrator on all questions that arise through the inter
pretation or application of the collective a g r e e m e n t . T h e

29

Vosloo, op. cit., p. 132.

30

Supra, pp.(
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Executive Order attempted to 'borrow this procedure from
the private sector, hut like much of the transplanting of
the basic framework of collective bargaining it was a
twisted and an abortive attempt.

Like most of the other

clauses in the order the proposal dealing with the grievance
procedure is weighted too much on the management side.
The procedure, similar to the private sector, provides for
an arbitration of differences than extend from the inter
pretation or application of agreements, but it then states
that "such arbitration shall be advisory in nature with
any decision or recommendation subject to the approval of
the agency head."-^
The objective of Executive Order 10988 was stability
in the public sector?

the means it provided in order that

this could be achieved was the introduction of collective
bargaining into the public sector.

But in introducing

collective bargaining to this sector the Order did not
take into account the basic framework of this process as
it had developed in the private sector.

The Executive

Branch of government attempted to adapt this framework to
meet their own special needs?

in doing so they only adop

ted a partial framework of bargaining and then attempted
to mix this with the old method of public employee relations
which was based on paternalism and unilateral decision
making.

The end result was that it failed to achieve its1

objectives.

31

Executive Order IO988, Section 8 (6).
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The failure of Executive Order 10988 becomes very
evident when one reads the profusion of current literature
which is emanating from this sector.^

<phe current dis

satisfaction and unrest can also be seen in the activities
of the huge postal Onions.

Both the Postal Clerks* Union

and Letter Carriers* Union recently (1969) dropped the no
strike clause from their constitution in direct violation
of the Executive Order and are presently on a collision
course with the administration.
Therefore, collective bargaining as it was introduced
into the American public sector appears to have been a
failure;

but before any arguments are put forth as to

why it was a failure and what can be done to make the pro
cess a more viable one, I will review the Canadian
experiences in this field.

32

Articles which bring out the point that the present
structure of collective bargaining in the American
public service is inadequate include; Marvin J.
Levine, "Dealing with Inadequacies in Collective
Bargaining in the Federal Government", Public
Personnel Review, vol. 30 (July, 1969)* pp. 164-168.
"New Directions in Bargaining", American Federationist,
vol. 70, pp. 18-21.
J. H. Foegen, "The Partial Strike;
A Solution in Public Employment;, Public Personnel
Review, vol. 30 (April,1969), pp. 83-87.
Robert E.
Catlin, "Should Public Employees Have the Right to
Strike", Public Personnel Review, vol. 29 (January,
1968), pp. 2-6.
Posey, op. cit., pp. 111-117.
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Chapter IV

Collective Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector

The application of the framework of collective bar
gaining to the structured form of bargaining that exists
in the American public sector showed that the two did not
correspond.

It was apparent throughout chapter III that

the executive in the United States was not really intent
on replacing the old method of unilateral decision making
for one based on relevant bilateral negotiations.

The

concept of sovereign supremacy is apparent throughout the
new approach;

the government did not relinquish any of

its ultimate authority.

The result, as was seen, was an

abortive type of collective bargaining which merely
attempted to placate the public servants.

The model of

collective bargaining was not adhered to;

consequently

the Executive Order did not, and could not, fulfil its
primary aid, which was to generate a more stable civil
service.
Canadian legislation in this area also had the
ultimate aim of establishing stability in the public
sector.

The means it chose to pursue this end was also a

form of collective bargaining.

This chapter will concern

itself with a comparison of the structured form of col
lective bargaining which was introduced into the Canadian

1

The objective of the government in introducing this
legislation was "to preserve the capacity of the public
service to function effectively in serving the people
of Canada". Lester Pearson, Debates, April 25, 19o6,
p. 4244.
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public sector with the outline developed in chapter I.
This will be done in order to see if there is a relation
ship between the degree of conformity and the degree of
stability#
The Canadian legislation on the subject of staff
2
relations in the public sector, unlike the American,
attempted to embody into its framework of collective bar
gaining the principle of bilateral negotiations.

Bill

C-182 which became An Act to Amend the Financial Adminis
tration Act was designed primarily for this purpose.

This

act provided for the expansion of the functions of Treasury
Board which enabled it to assume the role of employer in
negotiations with representatives of the employees.

This

was achieved by revising sections 5 and 7 of the Financial
Administration Act.
The revision of Section 5 allowed Treasury Board to
assume the responsibilities associated with personnel manage
ment in the public service.

Section 7 provided for a num

ber of new functions to be placed under the jurisdiction
of Treasury Board which would enhance its role as director
of personnel management.

These functions included the

responsibility for the determination of manpower require
ments, for establishing guidelines for training and

2

Canadian legislation on the subject of Collective Bar
gaining in the public sector consisted of three Acts,
"The Public Service Staff Relations Act", An Act
Representing Employee Relations in the Public Service
of Canada, S.C., (1967). c. 72; "The Public Service
Employment Act", An Act Respecting Employment in the
Public Service of Canada, S.C., (1967). c. 71: and An
Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act, S.C.,
TT967), c. 7^.
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development of personnel, for the classification system,
for the disciplinary standards, for work standards, for
pay rates, and for hours of work.

It was necessary to con

solidate these functions under one central agency because
collective bargaining is basically a two-party relationship.
Consequently, it was considered imperative to have authority
and responsibility in all essential matters invested in one
agency in order that it could negotiate with the employee
organizations in a responsible fashion.
The concentration of responsibility in the Treasury
Board, in my assessment, has worked out very well.

It has

assumed much the same role as the negotiating team for
management has in the private sector.

The acceptance and

effectiveness of this "steely eyed team of negotiators"^
can be seen in a statement by J. F. Maguire, the Research
Director of the Public Service Alliance of Canada*
The road travelled so far under collective
bargaining has not been an easy one. Bar
gaining with the Treasury Board has nearly
always been hard. At times, it has been a
lengthy, stubborn process. This has been
particularly true in areas where the Treasury
Board has been reluctant to yield, through
the collective bargaining process, rights
which management has traditionally in the
past kept as its own, i.e. the right to
make the final decision with respect to
implementing and changing conditions of
employment. ^
3

Clive Baxter, "No Holds are Barred in this Diplomacy",
The Financial Post, December 27, 19^9, p* 3*

4

J. F. Maguire, Development and Experience of Collective
Bargaining to Date, an unpublished paper delivered to
the Technical Inspection Group, May, 1969, p. 8.
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By placing authority for management decisions in the
hands of Treasury Board the Canadian Government was recog
nizing the need for bilateral negotiations.

But as was

brought out in the example of the United States it is es
sential that the employee organizations have an independent
existence before it cam be said that a significant two
party relationship exists.

The Canadian legislation

attempted to ensure this condition by establishing an
independent board, the Public Service Staff Relations
Board (P.S.S.R.B.).

This board was set up, along the

lines of the Labour Relations Boards that exist in the
private sector, to administer the Public Service Staff
Relations Act (P.S.S.R.A.).
The P.S.S.R.B. is an independent board which is com
posed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman and not less than
four, nor more than eight other members appointed in equal
numbers to represent the employer and the employees respec
tively. 5

The Chairman and the Vice Chairman are appointed

by the Governor in Council and they hold office during good
behaviour for a period not exceeding ten years.

Each of

the other members of the Board are also appointed by the
Governor in Council and they are appointed for terms of up

5

The Board as it is presently constituted consists of a
Chairman, a Vice Ghairman, and eight other members;
four representing the employer and four representing
the employees. It also has a full time secretariat
to carry out the administrative work.
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to seven years.

The responsibilities of this Board include

determining the appropriateness of a bargaining unit^,
certifying bargaining units, and investigating complaints
made by either the employer or the representative of the
employees regarding any activities on the part of the other
that are contrary to any of the provisions set forth in
the Act.

The Board also has the authority to order redress

in so far as its investigation demonstrated that such action
is warranted.
When the P.S.S.R.B. receives an application from an
employee organization requesting certification as a bar
gaining agent, it must determine three things;

first,

whether the bargaining agent represents a properly defined
bargaining unit;

second, whether the majority of the

employees in the unit want the employee organization to
represent them as their bargaining agent;' and third,
whether the employee organization is competent to organize
and conduct meaningful negotiations.

The Board may chal

lenge an employee organization on any of the above factors

6

In determining the appropriateness of a unit the Board
considers "the duties and classification of the employees
in the proposed bargaining unit in relation to any other
plan of classification as it may apply to the employees
in the proposed bargaining unit". Also the Board ensures
that the proposed bargaining unit includes only employees
of one occupational category, fcee appendix A), since
workers of more than one category are not allowed to be
grouped into the same unit. See the Public Service Staff
Relations Act, Section 32.

7

A majority of employees, unlike the American case, means
a plurality of those voting.
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by investigating the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit, by ordering a representative vote to ensure that the
majority of the employees do, in fact, want the employee
organization to represent them, or by examining evidence,
records and other documents respecting the organizations
constitution, election practices, and character of its
officials to ensure their competence.
Unlike the American situation in collective bargaining,
the Canadian employee organizations can be seen to have an
existence that is independent of the whims of management.
This autonomy enhances the two party relationship which is
so essential to the bargaining process.

Thus collective

bargaining as it is structured in the Canadian public ser
vice duplicates to a large degree the bilateral relationship
that exists in the private sector.

The one significant

difference is the requirement that the employee organization
be considered competent to carry out the processes involved
in collective bargaining before it is granted recognition.
However, this requirement, which has never been invoked,
does not directly affect the basic framework of bargaining
and as such can be considered as an outgrowth of it which
is peculiar to the public environment.

8

The next important part of the model of collective
bargaining is the concept of meaningful negotiations.

It

was pointed out in chapter III that there are two important

8

This requirement can be seen to have some justification
in the public sector because of its political nature.
The government is ultimately responsible for all policies
and as such needs to ensure that it is dealing with a
responsible party.
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aspects to this concept.

First, the ability of each side

to bargain in a responsible and a binding fashion, and
second, the scope of negotiations.

The first aspect has

already been dealt with earlier in this chapter.9

it was

pointed out that Treasury Board has assumed the role of
management negotiator which means that it can make binding
decisions.

Also, as it was pointed out earlier, the

P.S.S.R.B. can investigate a complaint by either side that
bargaining is not being conducted in accordance with the
procedures outlined in the Public Service Staff Relations
Act.

The, in light of its investigation, it can order a

party that is not bargaining faithfully to correct its
ways.

If the party refuses to do so, the Board can lay a

report before Parliament.

10

The second important aspect of meaningful negotiations,
the scope of bargaining, is the first place that the struc
tured form of collective bargaining in Canada does not cor
respond directly with the framework developed in chapter I.
This is because there are three important areas that remain
outside the bargaining process.

The first area is defined

in the Public Service Employment Act?

the second in section

7 of the P.S.S.R.A.j and the third in section $6 of the
same act.
The Public Service Employment Act removed all those
matters from the bargaining process "which are clearly
11

related to the preservation of the merit system”,

9

and

supra, pp. (j

10

See the Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 21.

11

Warner, Hennessey, op. cit.. p. 336.
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vested them in the Public Service Commission.

These in

cluded initial appointments, promotions, transfers, demotions,
lay-offs, and the determination of the qualifications which
are required for employment and advancement.
It was felt that in order to maintain the merit system,
a system which has been accepted in modern western societies
as the most desirable type on which to structure a bureau
cracy, it would be necessary to have an impartial commission
continue to regulate employment standards.

However, the

Government realized that it would not be feasible to have
the Commission setting up employment standards in an
arbitrary fashion when the rest of the activities con
cerning staff relations were governed by a bargaining pro
cess.

Consequently some provision had to be made to allow

for consultations between the Public Service Commission and
the representatives of both the employer and the employee.
This was done by incorporating in the Act a clause which
stated that
The Commission shall from time to time
consult with representatives of any
employee organization certified as a
bargaining agent under the Public Ser
vice Staff Relations Act or with any
employer as defined in that Act, with
respect to the selection standards that
may be prescribed under subsection (1)
or the principles governing the appraisal,
promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off
or release of employees, at the request
of such representatives or of the
employer or where in the opinion of
the Commission such consultation is
necessary or desirable.12
12

Public Service Employment Act, Part II, section 12 (3).
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However consultation is not the same as negotiation*
sultation only implies dialogue*

con

it does not necessarily

mean that an agreement will he reached.
Section ? of the Public Service Staff Relations Act
defines the second area of employer-employee relations that
is outside the bargaining process.

It establishes the

managerial rights of the employer and states that "nothing
in this Act shall be construed to effect the right or
authority of the employer, to determine the organization
of the Public Service and to assign duties and to classify
13
positions therein". J This establishes very clearly
that the areas of job organization,
technological change, assignment of
work and classification of positions,
is a right of the employer and, if
the employer desires, is not bargainable. The experience with bargaining
so far confirms that the employer is
definitely not prepared to negotiate
any of these matters.^
Section 56 of the Act outlines a further limitation on
the scope of collective bargaining in the public sector.
No collective agreement shall provide,
directly or indirectly, for the alter
ation or elimination of any existing
term or condition of employment or the
establishment of any term or condition
of employment, the alteration or eli
mination of which or the establishment
of which, as the case may be, would re
quire or have the effect of requiring
the enactment or amendment of any legis
lation by Parliament except for the pur
poses of appropriating money required
for its implementation.15
13

Public Service Staff Relations Act, section (7).

lh

Robert Giroux, Notes for Talk to the Ottawa-Hull Area
Council Seminar, October 30* 1969, an unpublished paper.

15

Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 56.
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This in effect means that the Government is hanging onto
the concept of sovereignty.

In one area, the monetary

realm, it agreed to limit its sovereignty;

in all other

areas it maintains the final say by forcing bargaining to
operate within the context of existing legislation.

This

is not to say that there is not a great deal of flexibility
involved in negotiations

in the public sector;

it is only

an assertion of the fact that negotiations are required to
operate within

broad parameters, and if one of the parties

wants to go beyond these boundaries they cannot do so
through the bargaining process but must concentrate on
initiating legislative changes.
The deviation from the basic framework of bargaining
in the area of the scope of the bargaining process, is not,
however, as serious as in the American situation.

The

employee organizations in Canada are able to negotiate
rates of pay, hours of work, leave entitlement, standards
of discipline, and general conditions of employment. These
are the important areas as far as the employees are con
cerned and consequently the amount of instability generated
by the limitations on negotiations which were discussed
above is not great.

However, the areas that are presently

outside the scope of collective bargaining have not been
accepted as final by the employee organizations.

They are

constantly trying to get management to voluntarily give up
the prerogatives outlined in section 7 at the bargaining
table and are directing their efforts towards the legis
lative process to get section 56 modified.
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- 88 The next important area of the outline of collective
"bargaining that has to "be applied to the Canadian situation
is the structured framework in which impasses "between
management and labour are resolved.

The Americans did not

transplant this aspect of the model into their public sec
tor, and its absence has contributed to the generation of
an unstable environment due to the preponderance of power
that has been left in the hands of management.

The

Canadian Government did not want the same situation to
exist in their public sector and consequently leaned to
wards the example q£iablished in the private sector.
In the Canadian public sector there are two methods of
dispute settlement incorporated in the structure of collective
bargaining, and before an employee organization is allowed to
bargain collectively it must specify which one it prefers.
Two dispute settlement options are provided
in the bill...one providing for a procedure
requiring a reference to a conciliation board
and permitting strike action, except in the
case of employees whose services are consi
dered essential to the safety or security of
the public.

16

Excerpt from Current Report on Legislation Affecting
Labour, Number 3> June 27, 1966. Prepared by Legislation
Branch, Department of Labour, Ottawa, Canada. The
employer under the Public Service Staff Relations Act
has the right to designate employees in any Occupational
Group whom it feels should be prohibited from striking
due to their importance to the safety and the security
of the State.

This is a unilateral decision on the part

of the employer. However, on the request of the bargaining
agent, the employer must furnish the P.S.S.R.B. with a
list of those employees or classes of employees which it
considers to be essential. If the bargaining agent dis
agrees with the list, it can appeal to the P.S.S.R.B. which
has the power to make the ultimate decision in the matter.
As of January, 1968, only 86 out of 30,000 employees who
had opted for conciliation had been designated. See Jacob
Pinkleman, "The Public Service Staff Relations Act", Public
Personnel Reviewi Public Service Alliance of Canada, vol. 4l,
(December, 1968), p. 30.
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If the bargaining unit decides to submit to arbitration it
loses its recourse to the strike.1?

It must be content to

request the services of the Public Service Arbitration
Tribunal to arbitrate disputes arising out of the nego
tiation process.

This Tribunal consists of a chairman

appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation
of the P.S.S.R.B., and
two panels of other members, one panel
to consist of at least three persons
appointed by the Board as being rep
resentative of the interests of the
employer and the other to consist of
at least three persons appointed by
the Board as being representative of
the interests of employees.18
Awards by the Arbitration Tribunal are binding on both
the Government and the employees in the bargaining unit
concerned.*9

The scope of the Tribunal in making its awards

is only as broad as the subject matter of negotiable items;
the Arbitration Tribunal cannot make awards on questions
that are "not a subject of negotiation between the parties
during the period before arbitration was

requested'?

.20

This

means that the award cannot contain provisions requiring
legislative implementation "nor can it deal with the stan
dards, procedures or processes governing the appointment,
appraisal, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or

17
' The method of settlement, however, can be changed prior
to another round of bargaining.

3.8

Public Service Staff Relations Act, section 60.

1^ Lester Pearson, then the Prime Minister of Canada, stressed
the binding nature of arbitration on both parties when
he introduced Bill C-170» "Arbitration will be equally
binding on the employer, the government, and the employee,
the public servant." Debates, April 25, 1966, p. ^246.
20 Ihid., section 70 (3).
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release of employees".2^If the "bargaining unit does not choose to use the "binding
arbitration approach to resolve their differences they have to
opt for the conciliation and strike approach.

This approach

is very similar to the one which is present in the private
sector.

A strike in the public sector is only legal seven

days after the receipt, by the chairman of the P.S.S.R.B.,
of a conciliation report, or after he has notified the parties
that he is not going to appoint a conciliation board.
In the private sector all industries retain the right
to strike if their negotiations with management fail; strike
action is the ultimate weapon and is guarded jealously.
The approach in the Canadian public sector differs from
this, as was shown above, but this does not mean that the
Canadian approach contradicts the basic framework of col
lective bargaining.

The framev/ork simply indicates that a

structured form of conflict resolution must exist which is
capable of solving impasses between management and labour.
It has already been said that a structure exists in which
conflicts can be resolved; what needs to be done to verify
conformity with the basic framework is to demonstrate that
the structure is capable of fulfilling its task.
In Canada, as of December 1969 , "there were 10^ bar
gaining units comprising 183,500 employees.

Thus far in

the first round of negotiations over half of the bargaining
units have already signed their first agreement and their
signed contracts cover over 80 per cent of the eligible

^

Ibid., section 70 (3)»
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This is quite an accomplishment when

it is taken into account that there are "first agreements
and the bargaining process usually takes much longer than
with renewed agreements, where the number of issues that
23
are raised at the bargaining table is much smaller." J
The number of contracts signed in the last two and a half
years (1967-69), under the added burden of being first
agreements, demonstrates that the structured method of
conflict resolution is capable of performing the task it
was created to do.
Thus far it has been shown that except in the area of
the scope of bargaining, the Canadian structure of collec
tive bargaining has conformed with the model developed in
chapter I.

This conformity also extends to that area of

the framework which suggested that a written agreement which
is designed to regulate the activities of both parties over
a given period of time must be the outcome of negotiations.

22

As of December 1969* there were approximately 185,000
employees who could conceivably be included in a
collective agreement.,Out of this number approximately
136,000 employees represented by the Public Service
Alliance of Canada (P.S.A.C.) were covered by contracts
and about another 25,000 employees, represented by the
Council of Postal Workers and other small unions were
also covered. These figures were arrived at from data
given by Jacob Finkleman, "Public Service Staff Relations
Board", Argus Journal, vol. 4 (December, 1969), p« 3**
and "Where We Stand on Certification", Argus Journal,
vol. 4 (November, 1969).

23

Finkleman, Argus Journal, op. cit., p. 3»

24

It can be argued that the first round of bargaining was
the honeymoon period of public service staff relations
which would mean that the process could become bogged
down in subsequent rounds*. I would suggest, however,
that such is not the case as the precedent has been
established for conflict resolution. The validity of
either hypothesis, however, can only be ascertained by
further developments.
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Management and labour in the Canadian public sector conform
to this requirement as they are bound by the terms of
collective agreement which they have negotiated.

If they

are unable to reach an agreement and the matter has to be
referred to binding arbitration, then both sides are bound
by the arbitral award.
The last important segment of the basic framework of
collective bargaining that remains to be applied to the
Canadian situation is the one which is concerned with the
resolution of conflicts that arise out of the interpretation
and application of the collective agreement.

As was seen

in chapter III the American Government established a struc
ture to perform this function.

This structure was not,

however, a viable one because it favoured one of the parties.
The other party, as a result, gradually lost confidence in
the structure.

To get away from this type of situation

the Canadian Government decided to adopt with minor modifi
cations the structure which had evolved in the private
sector to perform this function.
The function of contract interpretation, therefore,is
performed in the Canadian structure by the grievance pro
cedure.

Grievances concerning the application and inter

pretation of the contract have to go through three primary

25

The collective agreement or arbitral award must be
honoured by both parties. This is modified, however,
in one instance; the collective agreement is subject
to the appropriations by or under the authority of
Parliament of any monies that may be required by the
employer. See P.S.S.R.A., section 56 (1).
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These stages exist within the organizational

hierarchy of management and labour.

If a settlement can

not be reached at these levels then the matter leaves the
organizational hierarchy and goes to binding arbitration
by a neutral third party.

Arbitration is performed by an

adjudicator whose function it is to interpret the collective
agreement or arbital award.

His decision is final and

binding on both parties.
Where a decision on any grievance
referred to adjudication requires any
action by or on the part of the emp
loyer, the employer shall take such
action.
Where a decision on any grievance
requires any action by or on the part
of an employee or bargaining agent or
both of them, the employee or bargaining
agent or both, as the case may be,
shall take action..27
The discussion of collective bargaining in the Canadian
public service at the federal level has demonstrated that,
except for the area of negotiable items, it has incorporated
the basic outline of collective bargaining.

This should

mean, if the hypothesis concerning the relationship between
stability and the degree of implementation of the model is
correct, that there should be a fair degree of stability
in the Canadian public sector.

26

Adjudicators are appointed by the Governor in Council,
on the recommendation of the P.S.S.R.B.

27

P.S.S.R.A., section 96 (^) (5)»
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The degree of stability that exists in the Canadian
public sector can best be seen by looking at the degree of
friction that exists between the employee organizations
and Treasury Board.

The easiest way to measure this is to

look at the number of times that these two parties have
been unable to resolve their own differences in contract
negotiations.

The bargaining process has only broken down

three times.

The strike has been used once and binding
28
arbitration twice.
This is an extremely good record
when one considers that over 60 contracts have been
negotiated, by December, 1969.
The framework of collective bargaining has only been
operable for two and a half years and as such it is hard
to predict whether the stability that has been generated
thus far will continue.

The employee organizations are

confident, however, that if the collective bargaining pro
cess remains as it is, it will become an even more viable
instrument of stability in the future.
It is obvious, however, that given
time to learn to adjust to and live
with this new system of employeremployee relations, collective
bargaining will provide a benefit
to us all in the years a h e a d . 29

28

The strike has been used by the Council of Postal
Workers and binding arbitration by the Communications
and Education Groups.

29

Maguire, "Development and Experience of Collective
Bargaining to Date", op. »cit.~, p. 10.
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The danger of instability arising in the future does
not lie in the structure of collective bargaining, but
rather in the failure on the part of the government to
continue to recognize that its responsibilities as an
employer are separate from its role as government.-^0
This, of course, would mean an abnegation of the basic
framework of bargaining, as the two party relationship
would be placed in jeopardy.

30

This warning was given by Claude Edwards, the president
of the P.S.A.'C. in an editorial in the Argus Journal,
vol. b (December, 1969)# p. 2.
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CONCLUSION

The discussion of the Canadian and American legislation
on collective bargaining in the public sector in regards to their
adaptability to the framework of collective bargaining demon
strated that the former represented the model fairly closely
while the latter had very little resemblance to it at all.

My

hypothesis, at the beginning of this paper, was that stability
could only be achieved in the public sector through a well
structured process of bilateral negotiations modelled after the
framework of collective bargaining as it has developed in the
private sector.

This hypothesis I feel was borne out; Canadian

legislation conformed to the model of collective bargaining
and the conformity has resulted, in my opinion, in a fair
amount of stability.

American legislation, on the other hand,

did not provide for a structured form of collective bargaining
which incorporated the basic variables embodied in a meaningful
bargaining framework and this shortcoming has enhanced the
instability in this sector.

The present (March, 1970) unrest

in the American public sector generated by the postal strike
reflects the widespread feelings of insecurity and instability
which are present.
Of course many examples can be given that appear,
on the surface to contradict my hypothesis, or a profusion of
arguments can be put forward demonstrating that separate methods

must be employed in the separate sectors to deal with staff
relations due to the distinct character of each.

However, I

do not feel that these examples or arguments will stand up in
the long run.
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For the examples that, are pi.ven to con trad ict my
hypothesis T would argue that in these cases the evolutionary
stage of development of the public service has not yet reached
the stage where a structured form of bargaining would he
v

beneficial to both parties*

For the arguments stating that

the private and the public sectors ere different and, therefore,
must be dealt with differentlyj

I would counter with examples

from the private sector showing that collective bargaining; has

been effectively used i.n industries and services which closely
represent if not actually perform the same functions as those
that exist in the public sector.

Further,

I would suggest that

in a society based on specialization and differentiation all
industries and services ultimately work towards the benefit of
the populace and thus must be considered to be public in nature.
Thus a differentiation of labour practices based on whether an
industry or service is public or not has no relevance*
Stability and conformity to the model of collective
bargaining are intricately woven.

When any civil

service has

matured to the extent that it is ready and able to accent the
responsibility of participating in decisions concerning their
pay and working conditions, they must be given this responsi
bility*

If they are not, instability and agitation will result.

This is what has ha.ppened i.n the American civil service, and the
prospects for a stable public environment in that country

arc

only as bright as the chances of the introduction of meaningful
bilateral negotiations.

Threats, force, bribery or persuasion

are not suitable alternatives to an active role in activities
which are considered essential to ones being.
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APPENDIX A
The terms of' reference for the Preparatory Onmmi tt.oa
on Coll ective Bargaining included the task of developing an
orderly system of classification that would be conducive to
the introduction of collective bargaining into the public
serviced

A new classification was necessitated due to the

fact that the system that existed prior to ]967 was much too
cumbersome and awkward to be effective in any type of coll.ective
bargaining situation.

The system that was in effect prior to

the Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967 contained a
total of 700 classes which were subdivided into .1700 grades
and then divided still further into 138,000 classified positions.
In order to pursue its task of upda.ting the classi fioation system, the Preparatory Committee had the Civil Service
Commission create the Bureau of Classi fioation Revision in

1964.

This Bureau was responsible to the Civil. Service

Commission until 19 6 7 when the authority for reclassifycation
was transferred to the Treasury Board, rather.' than the Civil
Service Commission.
The Bureau was subdivided right from the beginning
into three main branches to facilitate its

task;

they were

the Planning Branch, the Operations Branch., and the Structures
and Standards Branch.--

The Planning Branch was responsible

for the general planning of approaches to classification for

1 The information on. reclassification was obtained primarily
from a speech given by J.F. Maguire, Research Director of
the Public Service Alliance of Canada to a Technical.
Inspection Group in May 1969, and from, an unpublished paper
prepared by R. Giroux, Assistant Research Director of the
Civil Service Federation of Canada, in 1off„
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was done

in writ,! nr
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It was also responsible for determining the

allocation of classes to categories and. occupational croups,
and for making recommendations as to the appropriate system of
classification that should he used to revise the classes.

O

The Operations Branch of the Bureau of Classification Revision
was responsible for gathering information on jobs in order to
facilitate the classification process} they performed this
function through position questionnaires that concentrated
on a content analysis of jobs that existed in the Public
Service.

These questionnaires were designed to probe into the

duties, the responsibilities, the qualification requirements,
and other pertinent data associated with the various positions
in order to facilitate the task of the Structures and Standards
Branch's task which was to develop classification standards.
The Operations Branch was also responsible for training and
developing classification officers i.n order that competent
men would be available to interpret and to apply

the

classification standards at the departmental level.
Structure and Standards Branch, besides

developing

The
classi

fication standards, was also responsible
for formulating rav
X
*

X

is

plans for each occupational group, and for converting positions

2
The method that was finally adopted was one based on a point
ratinsr svstem.
This svstem
was explained
verv adequately
«,•
X
by J.F. Maguire and his explanation is reproduced in
Appendix B.
-u

O

X
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- 100 from the old classi.f ication system to the

new.

3

The result of this monumental but necessary under
taking by the Bureau of Classi float Ion

Revision,

was, an

entirely new system of classification that adopted an occu
pational approach.

The Public Service was divided into six

occupational categories,

each of which contained a. number

of occupational groups.

These six categories along with

their job description, minimum qualifications, and occupational
groups, are listed below,
CATEGORIES AND GROUPS
EXECUTIVE CATEGORY
Description: This category is composed of positions in which
senior responsibilities for government functions are assigned,
and positions in which there is a requirement for exceptionally
high standards of performance in the development and execution
of policy or in administrative improvement and innovation.
Minimum Qualifications:
Demonstrated and outstanding executive abilities.
Occupational Groups:
Senior Executive Group
General Executive Group
SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY
Description: This category is composed of groups of a scien
tific or professional character in which there is a requirement,
for a highly developed nr specialized body of knowledge normally
acquired through, university education or through the completion
of extensive post-secondary school training.
3

Two basic problems were encountered in this transformation; one
was when reclassification resulted in the same job taking on
a. higher pay scale, and the second was when the same job was
devaluated to a lower pay scale.
In the f.irst case, an
employee that was affected by an upward evaluation would be
"green-circled"; this means that his pay would be elevated to
a corresponding pay rate within the higher category; In the
latter ce.se, the employee would be "red-circled" ,whi oh means
that his pay would be frozen until the salary maximum of his
new classification surpassed his current maximum.
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- 101 Minimum Qualifications;
University graduation* or membership in a recognzed
professional a.ssociation,
Occupational Croups.
Actuarial Science
Agriculture
*>
Architecture
Archival and Library Sciences
Auditing
Biology and Bacteriology
Chemistry and Physics
Cornrnerc e
Dentistry
Economics and Statistics
Education
Engineering
Foreign Service
Forestry
Geology
Home Economics
Law
Medicine
Meteorology
Nursing
Occupational and Physical Therapy
Pharmacy
Psychology and Social Work
Scientific R egu 1 a t ion
Scientific Research
Translation
Veterinary Sc i enc e

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FOREIGN SERVICE CATEGORY
Descript1o n s This category is composed of groups engaged in
the conduct, ad.mini strati on and direction of government
programmes, including internal management and service programmes,
i.n which there is a significant requirement for analytical
ability, judgement, human relations and orga.niziati.onal skills
and supervisory ability or potential.
Mini.mum Qualifications*
Either university graduation o r demonstrated capacity
for administrative work and. knowledge equivalent to that normally
attained through completion of secondary school education.
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- 102 Occupational Groups;
Adm.inistrative Services
Admln.istrat.lve Training
Computer Systems Administration
B'inaneia]. Administration
Information Services
Organization and Methods
Personnel Administration
Programme Adrainistration
Purchasing and Supply
Welfare Programmes
TECHNICAL CATEGORY
Description; This category is composed of groups in which
specialized techniques requireing highly developed stills are
performed; it excludes those groups for which university
graduation or equivalent qualif 1cations rare normally required*
Minimum Qua!ifications:
Completion of four years of secondary school.
Occupational. Groups
Aircraft Pilots
Drafting and Design
Electronics
General Technical
Photography
Primary Products Inspection
Radio Operation
Scientific and Laboratory Technician
Ships’ Pilots
Ships’ Officers
Technical Inspection
Air Traffic Controller
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT CATEGORY
Description; This category is composed of groups in which the
preparation, transcribing, transferring, systematizing and
maintenance of records, reports and communication is performed
either by manual or machine process.
It includes positions in
which there is a responsibility for supervision and for the
direct application of rules and regulations*
Minimum Qualifications:
Completion of two years of secondary school.
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- 103 Occupational G r oup s i
C omrnun icat ions
Data Process in g
Clerical and Regulatory
Office Equipment Operation
Secretarial, Stenographic, Typing
Telephone Operation

OPERATIQNAI. CATEGORY
Description; This category is composed of grclips in which
manual and related work of an unskilled, semi-vSkill.ed or
skilled nature is performed, and supervised.
Occupational Groups;

Correctional Group
F ir ef ight er s
General Labour a.nd Trades
General Services
Heating, Power, and Stationary Plant
Hospital Services
T,igh tkeepers
Postal Operations
Printing Trad es
Revenue Postal Operations
Ships Repair
Ships' Crews
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APPENDIX B
STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN PREPARING THE POINT RATING PLAN
First Step
Determining the Types of Jobs to Evaluate
This involves deciding on whether the point rating
plan will cover factory jobs only or both factory and office
jobs, or office jobs only.

Plans which are designed for jobs

of a relatively narrow type such as factory or Operational,
Clerical, or Supervisory, will result in a more accurate
classification of the jobs.

Plans that cover a wide range of

jobs will tend to include a large number of factors and will
not be as adequate as plans which cover a small range of jobs.
It is conceivable that a point rating plan which covers both
office and factory type jobs will include factors which are
not important for office jobs, i.e. Working Conditions and
Physical Demands, and will include factors which are not
important for factory type jobs, e.g. Contacts Factor.
Second Step
Collection of Job Information
This step involves the job analysis.

The job analysis

schedule or questionnaires must gather all the necessary infor
mation on the factors to be rated.
Third Step
Selection of Factors
There are many factors which can be selected for point
rating jobs.

These factors vary whether the jobs to be point
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- 105 rated will be factory type or clerical type.

Given a certain

type of jobs, certain rules should be followed in selecting
the factors to be rated*
(a)

The factors chosen must be ratable* that is
significant differences in degrees of each
factor can be defined and distinguished in
the jobs.

For example, a factor such as super

vision should vary from the supervision of no
workers to responsibility for the supervision
of all the employees in the work group.

If,

for example, supervision is not a characte
ristic of the jobs under study, then super
vision should not be chosen as a factor.

(b)

The factors chosen must be important, that is,
they must cover the major characteristics
which are common to all jobs.

In other words,

the factors chosen must be present in all jobs
and be useful in differentiating between jobs.
The most important factors are education,
experience, complexity, supervision, contacts,
errors, working conditions, etc.

(c)

The factors must not overlap in meaning.

Each

factor should be a measure of one and only one
aspect of the job.

For example, the factor of
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"accuracy" is almost the same as "effect of
errors".

If the definitions show that they

overlap in meaning, then they will receive
a double weight.

(d)

The Factors should meet both employer and
worker standards.

The practicability of a

point rating plan is based on the acceptance
of its value by both management and workers.
The same principle should hold in the selection
of job factors.
It should be remembered that the factors chosen
do not describe all aspects of the jobs under
study.

It would be impossible to achieve such

an objective.

The factors chosen deal with

those characteristics which are useful in
differentiating between jobs or determining
their relative values.

In the Clerical and

Regulatory Group, the Bureau of Classification
Revision has chosen 5 main factors which they
felt were common to all jobs and would bring
in differences between jobs.

These factors

are, Knowledge (made up of experience and
education) Complexity, Consequence of Error,
Responsibility for Contacts, and Supervision.
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Fourth Step
Definition of Factors
The meaning of the factors selected must he clear
to those who use them.

The definition of the factor usually

attempts to limit us to outlining the exact meaning of the
factor.

We have stated before that each factor selected should

represent one aspect of the total job value, and they should
not overlap.

In order to measure job values accurately, the

raters must have an understanding of each factor, so that
they will all measure one and the same aspect of the total
job value.

For example, the definition of the Knowledge Factor

in the Clerical and Regulatory Group Point Rating Plan is as
follows*

"This factor is used to measure the amount of

experience and education required to perform the duties of
the position effectively".
stop there.
follows*

The definition does not, however,

Experience and Education are also defined as

"Experience refers to the minimum level of academic,

technical or equivalent formal training required to provide
the basis for the development of the skill and knowledge needed
in the position."
Fifth Step
Defining Degrees for Each Factor
The point rating plan involves evaluating the job on
each of the selected factors.

This is done by using a series

of degrees within each factor, each degree having a different
point value.

For example, the Experience Factor is sometimes
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composed of the following degrees*
1.

Up to 1 month

2.

Over 1 month

3.

Over 3 months to 1 year

4.

Over 1 year up to 3 years

5.

Over 3 years

The factors selected are usually divided into degrees before
the relative point values of the factors are determined.

This

is because the importance of each factor is somewhat easier to
determine if the degrees have been established than with just
the factor definition alone.

The following rules are designed

to aid in defining degrees for each factor in a rating scale*
(a)

The number of degrees selected should be no
more than are needed to differentiate adequately
and fairly between all the jobs being rated.

(b)

Degrees should be selected so that jobs fall
at each level.

It is unwise to have a degree

at such a low level or such a high level that
no job can be placed into it.

(c)

Each degree should be cleaxly defined in terms
which the worker can understand.

(d)

Ambiguous terms should be avoided so that any
misinterpretation will be eliminated.
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Degrees should he written in objective terms*
For example* the sentence "•••must lift a
heavy load" is subjective* whereas "...must
lift 75 lbs." is objective.

(f)

Examples should be used as much as possible*
This is one of the reasons why bench-mark job
descriptions were provided as part of the
standards prepared by the Bureau of Classi
fication Revision.

These bench-marks are

helpful in that they exemplify the degrees of
each factor and form points of reference for
the rater to check his rating on a particular
factor with a similar rating on the same
factor for the bench-mark job.

Sixth Step
Determining the Relative Values of Job Factors
The job factors should not all have the same weight
or be considered equally important in measuring the value of
a job.

If, for example, the total possible number of points

for a job is to be 1,000, the distribution of these points
to each factor will depend on the relative importance of the
factors in measuring the value of the job.

In judging the

relative value of each factor, it must be kept in mind that
their relative values are to be judged as they contribute to
the difficulty and worth of all jobs.

The relative value of
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eaeh factor is usually determined by a panel of job evaluation
experts who are knowledgeable in the jobs being point rated
and know the importance of each factor*

The Bureau of Classi

fication Revision, in the Clerical and Regulatory Group, has
assigned the following point values to each factor on the basis
of its importance*
Knowledge

Max*

350 points

Complexity

Max.

300 points

Consequence of
Errors

Max.

100 points

Responsibility
for Contacts

Max.

100 points

Supervision

Max.

150 points

The total number of points a job can obtain is, thus, 1,000.

Seventh Step
Assigning Point Values to Factor Degrees
Once the relative value of each job factor has been
obtained, the next step is to assign points to the degrees in
each factor*

These point values can be assigned by an arith

metic progression, or a geometric progression.

The arithmetic

progression involves keeping the difference between each degree
the same, e.g. 0, 15* 30, ^5* etc.

The geometric progression

is based on the premis that each degree increases a given
percentage above the preceding one, e.g. 5» 10, 20, 40, 80,
where each degree is double that of the preceding one.

The

Bureau of Classification Revision, in the point rating plan
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- Ill for the Clerical and Regulatory Group, has used the following
method of assigning point values to degreesi

the point values

increase arithmetically as the degree of each factor increaseo
The minimum point value for supervision is one-tenth of the
maximum point value.
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